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Copyright and Good Faith Purchasers
Shyamkrishna Balganesh*
Good faith purchasers for value—individuals who unknowingly
and in good faith purchase property from a seller whose own actions
in obtaining the property are of questionable legality—have long
obtained special protection under the common law. Despite the
seller’s own actions being tainted, these purchasers obtain valid title
and are free to transfer the property without restriction. Modern
copyright law, however, does just the opposite. Individuals who
unknowingly, and in good faith, purchase property embodying an
unauthorized copy of a protected work are altogether precluded from
subsequently alienating such property without running afoul of
copyright’s distribution right. This Article examines copyright law’s
anomalous treatment of good faith purchasers and shows how the
concerns motivating the good faith purchaser doctrine in the common
law carry over to the principal settings where modern copyright law
operates. These concerns relate to the free alienability of property
and the undue informational burdens that consumers might have to
bear. The Article then develops an analogous doctrine for copyright
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law that would balance the concerns of copyright owners against
those of innocent consumers. Under this doctrine, good faith
purchasers for value of objects embodying infringing content would
obtain good title to such objects as long as they acquire the object
from its manufacturer before a judicial determination of infringement
against the manufacturer, i.e., so long as the manufacturer’s title is
merely voidable and not void. The Article illustrates how this
doctrine would work in practice and shows how its core elements
remain compatible with copyright law’s existing analytical structure
and normative ideals.
Introduction .................................................................................................... 271
I. Good Faith Purchasers for Value ................................................................ 277
A. Origins in the Common Law ....................................................... 277
B. Modern Common Law Protection ............................................... 280
1. Good Faith ............................................................................. 280
2. Value...................................................................................... 282
3. Voidable Title ........................................................................ 283
C. Justifications for the Common Law Doctrine .............................. 285
II. Copyright Law’s Puzzling Omission ......................................................... 287
A. The Current Position .................................................................... 287
B. A Misplaced Rationale for the Omission ..................................... 290
C. Justifying Good Faith Purchaser Protection in Copyright Law ... 297
III. Good Faith Purchaser Protection in Copyright Law ................................. 303
A. Analytic Precepts ......................................................................... 303
1. The Subsidiarity of the Distribution Right............................. 304
2. Courts and Declarations of Infringement ............................... 306
3. Reassigning Title to Infringing Articles ................................ 307
B. A Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine for Copyright ......................... 310
1. Void and Voidable Title in Relation to Infringement ............ 311
2. Good Faith Purchasers of Infringing Articles ........................ 314
3. The Shelter Rule .................................................................... 317
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 321

2016]

COPYRIGHT AND GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS

271

The triumph of the good faith purchaser has been one of the most
dramatic episodes in our legal history.
—Grant Gilmore (1954)1
Simply put, there is no such thing as a bona fide purchase for value in
copyright law.
—ISC-Bunker Ramo v. Altech, Inc (N.D. Ill. 1990)2

INTRODUCTION
The good faith purchaser for value, or good faith purchaser, is a rather
well-known figure in the modern common law of contract and property.3
Simply stated, the good faith purchaser is an individual who purchases an
object without knowing that the seller’s interest in that object is legally tainted
in some way.4 Rather than penalizing an innocent buyer in such situations, the
common law developed the good faith purchaser doctrine to protect the buyer
who had no knowledge of the underlying taint. So long as the purchase was
made in good faith the buyer would obtain a fully valid interest in the object,
one that could be further transferred without impediment.5 Once the good faith
purchaser obtained good title, he was thereafter empowered to transfer it to
others freely without having to worry about the validity of the various transfers.
The common law achieved this by treating the seller’s tainted interest as a
voidable title that could be freely transferred to the good faith purchaser at any
time until a court repudiated it.6 Central to the idea of voidable title was the
common law’s desire to maintain the free alienability of movables by
minimizing the informational burdens on potential buyers, which could serve to
deter their very interest in acquiring the object.

1. Grant Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057,
1057 (1954).
2. 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
3. For some of the leading work describing the idea, see J. WALTER JONES, THE POSITION
AND RIGHTS OF A BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE OF GOODS IMPROPERLY OBTAINED (1921);
James Barr Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1887); Calvin W. Corman,
Cash Sales, Worthless Checks and the Bona Fide Purchaser, 10 VAND. L. REV. 55 (1956); Gilmore,
supra note 1; Grant Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial Code:
Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REV. 605 (1981) [hereinafter Gilmore, Confessions];
Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 43 (1987); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Laws of Good Faith Purchase, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1332 (2011); Edward M. Swartz, The Bona Fide Purchaser Revisited: A
Comparative Inquiry, 42 B.U. L. REV. 403 (1962).
4. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989) (dealing with good
faith purchases).
5. See id.; Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1058–60.
6. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1059; see also Gilmore, Confessions, supra note 3, at 609.
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While the good faith purchaser doctrine has its origins in the law relating
to the sale of goods, it moved in due course to a host of other areas involving
analogous commercial transactions: negotiable instruments, corporate
securities, bonds, and, eventually, even land purchases.7 By the mid-twentieth
century, the expansion of the doctrine and its underlying rationale prompted
Grant Gilmore to famously conclude that “[t]he triumph of the good faith
purchaser has been one of the most dramatic episodes of our legal history.”8
While the doctrine has met with intermittent objection and criticism over the
years, it continues to be routinely invoked and applied in almost all common
law jurisdictions.
Given the long and exalted history of the doctrine in the common law,9 it
is altogether surprising that modern copyright law not only offers good faith
purchasers absolutely no protection but also subjects them to potential liability.
Under current copyright law, when a buyer acquires an object containing
copyrighted expression, they must ensure that their use of such expression in
the object is a noninfringing, authorized use. If it turns out that despite the
buyer’s best efforts to ascertain this, the object does in fact contain infringing
expression, copyright law severely curtails the buyer’s ownership rights in the
object. The innocent buyer in such a situation is precluded from transferring the
object to other members of the public, since such a transfer would violate the
copyright owner’s distribution right.10 Additionally, if the buyer learns of the
infringing content at the time of the attempted sale, even if this was unknown at
the time of the purchase, the buyer—even though he was a good faith
purchaser—could be prosecuted for criminal copyright infringement.11 In
effect, copyright law treats a good faith purchaser’s ownership over an object
embodying infringing content as fundamentally inalienable. The condition of
inalienability effectively operates as an equitable servitude on the purchaser’s
title to the object.12
To be sure, it is hardly the case that copyright law consciously conflates
the ownership of copyright with the ownership of the physical object that
contains the copyrighted work. To the contrary, copyright law has long cared
about separating the two, both analytically and functionally.13 Its principal

7. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1063–77; 3 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 2284 (3d ed. 1939).
8. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1057.
9. For an excellent historical account of the development of the doctrine, see Harold R.
Weinberg, Markets Overt, Voidable Titles, and Feckless Agents: Judges and Efficiency in the
Antebellum Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1981).
10. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
11. Id. § 506(a) (detailing requirements for criminal liability for copyright infringement).
12. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945
(1928).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 202 expressly provides:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
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device for separating the ownership of copyrighted expression from the
ownership of the object is the first sale doctrine.14 Originally the creation of
courts, the first sale doctrine allows the owner of a physical object that
embodies copyrighted content to sell that object without incurring liability for
copyright infringement. However, for the doctrine to apply, the law demands
that the “first” sale of the content be authorized, or legal.15 In other words, in
situations where the first sale was itself an infringement, the law precludes the
purchaser from selling the object. In essence, copyright’s first sale doctrine
directly rejects protecting the good faith purchaser’s title.
In addition, since the early twentieth century, U.S. copyright law has
consciously treated copyright infringement as a strict liability tort, specifically
eliminating all protection for “innocent sellers” of infringing products.16 Based
on the argument that such an exception would hurt the interests of copyright
owners and present courts with insurmountable evidentiary problems,
copyright law today treats an infringer’s intent or good faith as altogether
irrelevant to the question of liability.17 Together with the inapplicability of the
first sale doctrine to such purchases, courts therefore readily accept the reality
that “there is no such thing as a bona fide purchase for value in copyright law”
today.18 Indeed, this reality is routinely treated as altogether uncontroversial.
Unlike in the common law, which exempts the good faith purchaser from
bearing the burden of the seller’s unlawful behavior, copyright law forces the
good faith purchaser to be vigilant about a seller’s use of protected expression
when buying the object. If the purchaser fails to detect the seller’s unlawful
(i.e., infringing) behavior—even after making all possible efforts—his title
over the object becomes functionally defective. Caveat emptor, or “buyer,
beware!” remains copyright law’s emphasis, even though the law in all other
fields has turned away from this emphasis and in favor of consumer
protection.19

Transfer of ownership of any material object, including the copy or phonorecord in
which the work is first fixed, does not of itself convey any rights in the copyrighted
work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an agreement, does transfer of
ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights under a copyright convey
property rights in any material object.
14. The doctrine has been codified. See id. § 109; see also 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.12 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2015).
15. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) provides that “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or
phonorecord.” (emphasis added).
16. See R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133 (2007).
17. 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1].
18. See, e.g., ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (citation omitted).
19. See generally Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J.
1133 (1931).
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Copyright law’s failure to protect good faith purchasers carries with it
very important practical consequences. With advancements in technology and
manufacturing, the number of physical consumer goods that contain
copyrighted expression has grown exponentially in the last few decades. As a
recent Supreme Court decision noted, in today’s marketplace, “‘automobiles,
microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, tablets, and personal computers’
contain copyrightable software programs or packaging . . .” and innumerable
other consumer products “bear, carry, or contain copyrighted ‘packaging,
logos, labels, and product inserts and instructions for [the use of] everyday
packaged goods.’”20 Requiring consumers to ascertain whether the products
they regularly purchase contain any infringing content or expression would
place an enormous informational burden on consumers—precisely the type of
burden that the good faith purchaser doctrine was developed to avoid.
For one, much of this expression is usually concealed and technical in
nature (e.g., software code in an electronic device). Additionally, determining
whether something is infringing is no easy task. It necessitates determining
whether the expression was protectable under copyright law, whether it was
copied from another protected work, whether it was “substantially similar” to
the work from which it was copied, and whether such copying might indeed be
lawful because of copyright law’s several exceptions and limitations.21 Lastly,
given how long the term of protection is for copyright (i.e., the life of the
author plus 70 years or 120 years from the date of creation),22 an infringement
could be determined several years after the creation of the work. A purchaser’s
title might thus come to be tainted decades after the initial purchase. In light of
these far-reaching realities, it is somewhat bewildering that copyright’s
omission to accord a good faith purchaser any protection has received such
little scrutiny and discussion—among courts, scholars, and policymakers.
Consider the following scenario, which illustrates this anomaly and,
indeed, its ubiquity. Joe is looking to buy a used car. One morning, he comes
across Frank’s Craigslist advertisement offering to sell his 2008 Honda Civic
for $15,000. Joe meets Frank, inspects the vehicle, takes it for a test drive, and
agrees to buy the car. Frank tells Joe that he has had the car for less than a
month and is selling it because he has been forced to relocate. Joe verifies all
the documentation associated with the vehicle (registration, title, etc.), pays
Frank in cash, and drives away.

20. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1365 (2013) (citation omitted).
21. For a good overview of copyright law’s uncertainty and the normative proposals
associated with this phenomenon, see Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 331, 337–55 (2012).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c) (2012) (providing that the copyright term “endures for a term
consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author’s death” or, in the case of anonymous
works, pseudonymous works, or works made for hire, for “a term of 120 years from the year of its
creation”).
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Unbeknownst to Joe, Frank had obtained the car from a local car dealer a
few days earlier by impersonating an employee and writing a forged check. It
takes the car dealership a week or so to discover Frank’s trickery (i.e.,
impersonation), by which time Joe has purchased the vehicle from Frank and is
in possession of it. Under the common law, the car dealership cannot recover
the vehicle from Joe. Joe is a good faith purchaser for value, who obtains
perfect title and is protected. Frank’s title was voidable—and since the
dealership did not avoid it before the transfer to Joe—the law protects Joe’s
ownership.23 A few months later, when Joe wants to sell the vehicle to Cindy,
who he finds on a website for used cars, he is therefore at complete liberty to
do so, and Cindy too obtains perfect ownership of the car. The car remains
freely transferable in the marketplace, with no constraints.
Now consider the following twist. A few months after Joe buys the car
from Frank, a federal court finds that Honda committed copyright infringement
by using Toyota’s software code in the engine maintenance module of all
Honda Civics manufactured after 2007. Joe gets good faith purchaser
protection at common law, which protects him against Frank’s fraud in
procuring the car. However, Joe’s ownership is nonetheless severely emaciated,
because copyright law disallows him from selling, renting, leasing, or
otherwise transferring the vehicle to the public, by treating such an act as a
violation of the copyright owner’s (i.e., Toyota’s) distribution right.24 If Joe
sells the car to Cindy—even without their knowing about Honda’s
infringement at the time of the sale—Toyota could bring a claim for copyright
infringement against him, seeking an injunction, statutory damages, or both. In
effect, copyright law forces Joe to hold on to the $15,000 car for the duration of
Toyota’s copyright: 120 years! Joe’s ownership interest, while protected by the
common law, is thus eviscerated as a functional matter by current copyright
law.
In this Article, I examine this surprising anomaly within copyright law. A
close examination of the reasons behind the development of the common law’s
good faith purchaser doctrine reveals that they remain of equal, if not greater,
applicability in the primary domains where consumers interact with copyright
law in the modern context. This fact is only compounded by copyright law’s
rather fundamental dependence on litigation to determine the existence and
scope of an infringement. Based on this reality, and the recognition that
Congress consciously chose to do away with any exception to liability for all
innocent infringers, the Article suggests a position that distributes the burdens

23. For an actual case with a nearly identical fact pattern where the court came to the same
conclusion, see Marlow v. Conley, 787 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that an innocent
buyer who purchased a vehicle from a seller who had defrauded the original owner was protected
against the owner’s claim, since the buyer had obtained the certificate of title from the seller).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
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of infringement equally between copyright owners and good faith purchasers
through the recognition of a good faith purchaser doctrine in copyright law.
Building on the centrality of adjudication to the question of infringement,
as well as on the underappreciated reality that copyright’s distribution right is
analytically dependent on the reproduction right, a good faith purchaser
doctrine for copyright would work in four important ways. First, anyone who
makes an unauthorized reproduction of the work and embodies that
reproduction into a chattel should be treated as having “voidable” (rather than
void) title to the chattel until a final judicial determination of infringement is
made against that person, at which time the title should be considered to have
been avoided, i.e., rendered void as a result of that determination. Second, a
good faith purchaser for value of that chattel from a seller with voidable title
would obtain good title to that chattel, provided of course that the transfer
(from the seller with voidable title) occurred prior to the determination of
infringement. Third, the good faith purchaser would remain free to transfer the
chattel—without risk of infringement—to others on the market without
triggering potential liability for copyright infringement. Fourth, subsequent
purchasers from a good faith purchaser would also obtain good title to the
chattel, and remain able to further alienate it on the market without liability.25
Good faith purchaser protection of this kind in copyright law is unlikely to
interfere seriously with a copyright owner’s legitimate interests. While each
subsequent transfer is, technically speaking, a violation of the distribution right
under current law, it nonetheless derives—as a causal matter—from a unitary
wrongful act: the production of infringing content and its incorporation into an
object, which amounts to an unauthorized reproduction, i.e., an infringement of
the reproduction right by the producer of the object. Since the copyright owner
will have the ability to go after the original wrongdoer for harm arising from
that infringement, denying the owner equivalent claims against every
subsequent transferee or consumer who attempts to resell the item does no
harm to the copyright owner’s interests, and at the same time greatly promotes
the marketability of the object involved.
The Article unfolds in three parts. Part I begins by briefly setting out the
basics of good faith purchaser protection at common law. It traces the origins
of the doctrine and examines the primary motivations and considerations that
went into the construction of the doctrine, both in its historical and modern
forms. Part II then focuses on the puzzle that is at the heart of the paper:
copyright law’s anomalous treatment of the good faith purchaser and its
attempts to impose liability on such purchasers. It begins by examining modern
copyright law’s treatment of good faith purchasers and then walks through the
25. And they would, in turn, obtain identical protection. This rule is known as the “shelter
rule” in the law relating to good faith purchasers. See Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of
the Law”: Toward a Theory of Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95,
97–99 (1991).
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historical reasons for copyright’s omission of such protection to show how
copyright law’s purported rationale for the omission is premised on a
fundamental non sequitur. It then argues that most of the reasons offered for
good faith purchaser protection in the common law readily carry over to
copyright law, where the realities of technological development and the
modular nature of goods exacerbate the informational burdens placed on
innocent purchasers. Finally, Part III argues for the creation of a good faith
purchaser doctrine in copyright law. In so doing, it first draws on the analytical
logic embedded within the working of copyright’s distribution right, the first
sale doctrine, and the copyright statute’s remedial measures relating to
“infringing articles.” It then discusses what good faith purchaser protection
would look like in copyright law, and draws out the principal consequences
that would flow from such protection for innocent purchasers and for third
parties acquiring infringing articles from them.
I.
GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS FOR VALUE
Before getting at the anomaly that lies at the heart of this Article, namely
the divergence of copyright law and the common law on the protection
afforded to good faith purchasers, this Part provides a brief overview of the
basic ideas, concepts, and motivations underlying such protection at common
law. It looks at some of the history behind the doctrine and how the doctrine
has come to be extended and applied in the modern context, all of which
remains directly relevant to understanding the puzzling nature of copyright
law’s omission of similar protection.
A. Origins in the Common Law
As a historical matter, the origins of the good faith purchaser doctrine in
English common law are usually traced back to the sixteenth century, when it
began to take shape under a largely analogous doctrine referred to as “market
overt.”26 The market overt doctrine sought to protect purchasers who bought
their goods from sellers in “open” fairs and markets, which formed the
principal channel for trade during the time.27 Since these markets were open
and visible to the public at large, the seller was thought to be signaling publicly
about the existence of an ostensible authority to transfer the goods in question.
The innocent purchaser who relied on this authority was believed to be worthy

26. See JONES, supra note 3, at 33; Daniel E. Murray, Sale in Market Overt, 9 INT’L & COMP.
L.Q. 24 (1960); J.G. Pease, Market Overt in the City of London, 31 LAW Q. REV. 270 (1915); J.G.
Pease, The Change of the Property in Goods by Sale in Market Overt, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 375 (1908);
Peter M. Smith, Valediction to Market Overt, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 225 (1997).
27. JONES, supra note 3, at 38–39 (describing the contours of such fairs and markets where the
rule applied, and observing that the “market must be a legally constituted one”); see also Smith, supra
note 26, at 235–42 (detailing the requirements of the doctrine).
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of protection to ensure that buyers weren’t altogether dissuaded by the
likelihood of losing their purchased items despite their reliance on the seller’s
deception, which could in turn cause commerce to suffer. Sir William
Blackstone provides an early description of the doctrine and its rationale:
But property may also in some cases be transferred by sale, though the
vendor has none at all in the goods; for it is expedient that the buyer,
by taking proper precautions, may at all events be secure of his
purchase; otherwise all commerce between man and man must soon be
at an end. And therefore the general rule of law is, that all sales and
contracts of any thing vendible, in fairs or markets overt (that is, open),
shall not only be good between the parties, but also be binding on all
those that have any right or property therein. . . . By which wise
regulations the common law has secured the right of the proprietor in
personal chattels from being d[i]vested, so far as was consistent with
that other necessary policy, that purchasers, bona fide, in a fair, open,
and regular manner, should not be afterwards put to difficulties by
reason of the previous knavery of the seller.28
Similar descriptions of the doctrine and its purpose are found in Coke’s
Institutes.29 In simple terms, the market overt doctrine allowed a good faith
purchaser (the “bona fide” purchaser) who purchased an item in customary fair
or market, with no knowledge of the seller’s deception, and through an arm’s
length transaction, to be secure of his ownership interest in the item, i.e., to
obtain good title even against the original owner of the item. The only
exception to this general rule was in relation to “stolen” property, with the
understanding that a thief could never transfer good title to another.30
The market overt doctrine represented an early modification of the rule
nemo dat quod non habet, or “one cannot give that which one does not have.”31
Notably, the early form of the doctrine described the situation in largely binary
terms. Either the good faith purchaser obtained no title—as in cases of theft—
or the good faith purchaser obtained perfect title, leaving the original owner
with no recourse whatsoever. Central to the doctrine was therefore the
recognition that commerce necessitated such clear title (or lack thereof) as a
direct incentive. In recognizing the role of such fairs and markets in commerce
and the idea that they were a source of great sustenance for communities, Coke
thus observed in no uncertain terms that through the market overt doctrine “the
common law did ordain (to encourage men thereunto).”32 By the late nineteenth
28. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *450–51.
29. See 2 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 713 (W. Clarke &
Sons ed., 1809) (1642).
30. See 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *448 (“But if my goods are stolen from me, and
sold, out of market overt, my property is not altered, and I may take them wherever I find them.”).
31. Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2120
(2012). A variant of this maxim is the statement “nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse
habet.” JONES, supra note 3, at 4; Smith, supra note 26, at 225 n.4.
32. 2 COKE, supra note 29, at 713.

2016]

COPYRIGHT AND GOOD FAITH PURCHASERS

279

century, the common law doctrine of market overt came to be codified in
England.33
When the market overt doctrine crossed the Atlantic and made its way to
the American colonies, however, American common law courts were at first
somewhat skeptical of its consequences and of the claim that the doctrine was
essential to commerce.34 Particularly important in this skepticism appears to
have been the binary approach that the early common law adopted, which
required courts to choose between declaring the purchaser’s title absolutely
invalid and declaring it to be perfectly valid. In addition, the very idea of
customary, regulated markets and fairs—which drew from English customary
practice—seems to have found few parallels in the colonies.35 By the
nineteenth century this began to change, and courts became more open to
protecting the good faith purchaser, now quite independent of markets overt.36
As some historians have pointed out, changes in the American economy
“increased the impersonality of commercial activity,” which enhanced the risks
placed on good faith purchasers.37 Thus emerged the concept of voidable title,
which enabled courts to avoid conceptualizing good faith purchaser protection
in purely binary terms. Under the voidable title idea, a seller whose interest in
the good was tainted in some way could pass on perfect title to a good faith
purchaser for value, as long as the original owner had not avoided that seller’s
title altogether through a legal action prior to the sale to the good faith
purchaser. In this approach, the seller’s title was treated as neither perfect nor
altogether nonexistent, but as voidable, meaning that it could be set aside by
bringing a legal action. Yet, until such avoidance it was capable of functioning
as perfectly valid. The idea drew from contract law, which has for long
maintained a distinction between void agreements and voidable contracts.38
American courts, it would appear, came to recognize the undue burden that a
rule of no title would place on good faith purchasers by relegating to them the
costs of investigating title during each transaction, thereby impeding the
efficient functioning of markets. One nineteenth-century court thus observed,

33. Sale of Goods Act 1893, 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, § 22(1) (Eng.). The section reads: “Where
goods are sold in market overt, according to the usage of the market, the buyer acquires a good title to
the goods, provided he buys them in good faith and without notice of any defect or want of title on the
part of the seller.” Id.
34. See Weinberg, supra note 9, at 7 (observing that the doctrine was rejected and disapproved
by courts in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, Maryland, Vermont, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky,
and Virginia, by the middle of the nineteenth century).
35. See, e.g., Heacock v. Walker, 1 Tyl. 338, 341 (Vt. 1802) (“[I]n this State we have no such
city customs; no prescriptive rights to vend particular articles in particular places; no fairs or statute
markets.”).
36. Weinberg, supra note 9, at 16–17.
37. Id. at 16.
38. See FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 7 (3d ed.
1906) (“A voidable act . . . takes its full and proper legal effect unless and until it is disputed and set
aside by some person entitled so to do.”).
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after applying the doctrine to find for a good faith purchaser, that “[a] contrary
principle would endanger the security of commercial transactions, and destroy
that confidence upon which what is called the usual course of trade materially
rests.”39
Thus emerged the modern doctrine of the good faith purchaser in
American law. In 1906, the Uniform Sales Act codified the doctrine for the
first time, by providing that “[w]here the seller of goods has a voidable title
thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer
acquires a good title to the goods, provided he buys them in good faith, for
value, and without notice of the seller’s defect of title.”40 A few years later, the
Uniform Commercial Code replaced the Uniform Sales Act, and a majority of
states adopted it as their law. Section 2-403 of the Code explicitly recognizes
the good faith purchaser doctrine and reiterates its nonbinary nature by relying
on the idea of voidable title.41 In situations where an individual obtains goods
from another (the original owner) through deception, a dishonored check,
fraud, or the like, the law treats that individual’s title as facially voidable,
allowing her to transfer good title to a “good faith purchaser for value.”42 The
original owner, i.e., the victim of the deception or the recipient of the bad
check, can nonetheless prevent this if she succeeds in converting the deceiver’s
voidable title into a void title prior to the sale to the good faith purchaser.
B. Modern Common Law Protection
As currently understood, the good faith purchaser doctrine embodies three
distinct elements: (1) the purchaser’s good faith; (2) the transaction being a sale
for value; and (3) the seller’s title being voidable as a legal matter. Each of
these elements deserves elaboration here since a good faith purchaser doctrine
for copyright law might usefully retain many of these basic ideas.
1. Good Faith
The precise meaning of “good faith,” at least insofar as it is applied to the
good faith purchaser doctrine, has varied over time. Early on in the
development of the doctrine, the idea was treated as synonymous with “absence
of knowledge” on the part of the purchaser.43 It was hardly a conduit through
which to examine the purchaser’s state of mind. An alternation seems to have
emerged only when the doctrine began moving to the context of negotiable
instruments and commercial paper.44 Around this time, cases arose where

39. Root v. French, 13 Wend. 570, 572 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
40. UNIF. SALES ACT § 24, U.L.A. app. I (1906).
41. U.C.C. § 2-403 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989).
42. Id. § 2-403(1).
43. JONES, supra note 3, at 14–15.
44. Id. at 15 (observing that the idea “began to be more fully discussed, as something different
from mere absence of knowledge, when negotiable instruments became common”).
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courts began asking whether the purchaser had acquired the goods “in the usual
course of business,”45 and whether the purchaser had “asked all those questions
which . . . a party ought to ask.”46 Thus developed the objective approach to
good faith, wherein courts asked whether the purchaser had behaved in a way
that a reasonably prudent person would have behaved under the
circumstances.47 Shortly thereafter, courts grew uncomfortable with the
objective approach and reverted back to a subjective one, suggesting that no
amount of negligence on the part of the purchaser could deprive them of
protection under the doctrine.48 As the law moved to the United States,
American courts seemed fairly reluctant to embrace an objective standard.
Commentators confirm that a more subjective standard prevailed, under which
the purchaser’s “actual behavior” was the focus of the investigation.49 This is
supposedly captured in observations such as: “suspicious circumstances
sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry . . . are not sufficient of themselves
to prevent recovery.”50 Over time, the law appears to have oscillated between
objective and subjective versions of the test.
“Good faith” was finally defined by the codification of the doctrine in the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). In the current definition, the codifiers
appear to have adopted an objective approach to the definition by providing
that good faith “means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.”51 Much of the work in this definition is
done by the idea of “fair dealing,” which is in turn meant to be understood
contextually and as connected to “fairness of conduct,” rather than the specific
level of care exercised. Consequently, the good faith purchaser merely needs to
comply with reasonable commercial standards, not in some abstract sense, but
as they relate to fair dealing.52 Or, as one commentary puts it, “[t]he issue is
one of ‘unfairness’ not of ‘negligence,’” which appears to have produced some
confusion among courts.53

45. Miller v. Race (1758) 97 Eng. Rep. 398 (KB) 402 (internal quotations omitted).
46. Gill v. Cubitt (1824) 107 Eng. Rep. 806 (KB) 809.
47. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 707 (6th ed.
2010).
48. See, e.g., Goodman v. Harvey (1836) 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (KB); Crook v. Jadis (1834) 110
Eng. Rep. 1028 (KB). For an excellent overview of this movement in the law, see Neil O. Littlefield,
Good Faith Purchase of Consumer Paper: The Failure of the Subjective Test, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 48,
50–52 (1966).
49. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 707–08.
50. Id. at 707 n.2. (citing F. BEUTEL, BEUTEL’S BRANNON NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
772–74 (7th ed. 1948)).
51. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2011) (emphasis added).
Absent the reasonableness language in the section, the definition could be, and indeed was, understood
as embodying the subjective approach. For an excellent overview of the controversy and opposition
surrounding the Code’s adoption of the objective approach in the definition, see Littlefield, supra note
48, at 57–59.
52. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 709.
53. Id.
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As the doctrine is currently understood, the good faith requirement entails
an assessment of the buyer’s behavior at the time of the purchase. It is perhaps
overly simplistic to try and characterize its working in binary terms, as either
subjective or objective.54 The assessment is heavily contextual and often times
looks to multiple aspects of the transaction to examine whether the buyer’s
behavior was reasonable under the circumstances. Thus, courts have held that
when a buyer purchases a chattel, such as a car, without complying with the
ordinary process through which such chattel is normally acquired in the market
(e.g., title and deed), these circumstances ought to have raised sufficient
suspicion, meaning that the buyer cannot be said to have acted in good faith.55
Another common circumstance is where the buyer obtains an item for a price
that is dramatically lower than its ordinary market value. This too has caused
courts to conclude that the purchaser did not act in good faith.56 Despite these
emerging patterns, the leading commentary on the U.C.C. “caution[s] anyone
who is confident about the meaning of good faith to reconsider.”57
2. Value
The good faith purchaser must be a purchaser for value. On its face, this
suggests that valuable consideration must have moved from the purchaser to
the seller in return for the item and title over it. Early English decisions insisted
that the consideration be “valuable” as opposed to merely good or meritorious,
implying that some detriment on the part of the purchaser needed to be shown
for it to qualify.58 Modern American law takes a much simpler position, and the
U.C.C. today defines “value” in extremely broad terms.59 It includes “any
consideration” that would qualify to support a simple contract, thereby
outsourcing the determination to state contract laws, which tend to adopt much
less exacting standards than English law.60 Additionally, it also includes
situations where the purchaser accepts delivery under a prior contract for
purchase, and covers the acceptance of something for a preexisting claim,
thereby making clear that debts can amount to consideration, an issue that early
on had divided courts.61 As noted previously, the question of value is hardly
ever a contested issue during the application of the good faith purchaser
54. For an early argument along these lines, see Littlefield, supra note 48, at 50 (suggesting
that the dichotomy emerged mostly out of “convenience”).
55. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Worthey, 612 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
56. See, e.g., Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. App. 1992).
57. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 201.
58. JONES, supra note 3, at 25 & n.9.
59. See U.C.C. § 1-204 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1989) (defining “value”). The
leading commentary on the subject notes that “[a]lmost any purchaser . . . except a donee, gives value”
under the definition. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 200.
60. See U.C.C. § 1-204(4). For the standard under English law, see JONES, supra note 3, at 25
(observing how early English law emphasized “money consideration”).
61. U.C.C. § 1-204(2), (3); see JONES, supra note 3, at 27 (“[A] pre-existing debt is not, in
itself, sufficient to support a simple contract.”).
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doctrine (as long as there was a commercial transaction), and it comes up only
indirectly as a factor during the assessment of the purchaser’s good faith.
3. Voidable Title
A critical component of the good faith purchaser doctrine at common law
is the idea of “voidable title.”62 Voidable title came to signify the existence of a
potentially actionable taint on the seller’s title that required legal action on the
part of the owner in order to attach. Voidable title is thus a situation where the
law recognizes a holder as having “legal title but his transferor has the right to
avoid the transfer and reassert title in himself.”63 Voidable title came to be
contrasted with “void title,” representing situations where the law—as a matter
of public policy—demanded no further action on the part of the owner for the
taint to attach.64 In these situations, the taint was considered significant and
injurious enough that the law refused to find any legal title in the holder.
Paradigmatic of such void title is a seller’s possession of goods obtained
through theft.65 The law views the crime of theft as sufficiently harmful and
worthy of condemnation that it attaches the taint to the seller’s possession right
away, without the need for any action on the part of the owner for the taint to
attach. To this day, possession through theft remains the primary, and perhaps
only, instance of void title at common law, one that is incapable of protecting a
good faith purchaser. It is important to note that it is not just the involvement of
criminal law that renders title void, since innumerable types of fraud and
trickery that are punishable as crimes are all perfectly capable of generating
voidable title despite their being classified as crimes by the law.66
The law’s distinction between void and voidable title therefore hinges on
two independent analytical variables. The first is the perceived gravity of the
taint in issue, and whether the law’s condemnation of the taint-generating
behavior overwhelms the need to provide good faith purchasers with any form
of protection. The understanding that theft—as opposed to other property
crimes—operates as an intrinsic wrong, i.e., malum in se, lies at the root of this

62. See 92A C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 581 (2014); Charles M. Weber, The Extension of
the Voidable Title Principle Under the Code, 49 KY. L.J. 437 (1961).
63. Weber, supra note 62, at 439.
64. See 10 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 374 (Phila. 1846) (“A
thing is void which was done against law at the very time of doing it, and no person is bound by such
an act; but a thing is only voidable which is done by a person who ought not to have done it, but who
nevertheless cannot avoid it himself after it is done; though it may by some act in law be made void.”).
For the rationale here, see 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *145 (“[I]f an acquisition of goods by
either force or fraud were allowed to be a sufficient title, all property would soon be confined to the
most strong, or the most cunning.”).
65. See, e.g., O’Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 868 (N.J. 1980); Stevens v. Hyde, 32 Barb.
171, 1860 WL 7506 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1860).
66. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(d) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
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idea.67 The second is the ease, certainty, and directness with which the very
existence of the taint can be ascertained. Where the illegality directly impacts
the transaction on its very face, such as when the transaction is prima facie
nonconsensual (e.g., a direct theft), the law is ready and willing to treat the
possessor’s title as altogether void. By contrast, when the illegality requires
proof of additional facts, the law treats the title that passes as voidable. Here,
the technical nature of the criminality is seen as serving alternative goals that
do not implicate protection of good faith purchasers. We see this logic at play
in the U.C.C.’s good faith purchaser provision, where the drafters were acutely
aware that “larceny” had expanded to include offenses that went well beyond
the traditional idea of a mere unlawful taking, i.e., a theft.68 In choosing to treat
such expanded forms of larceny as generating voidable rather than void title,
the drafters noted that the good faith purchaser doctrine is “freed from any
technicalities depending on the extended law of larceny.”69 Further, “such
extension of the concept of theft to include trick, particular types of fraud, and
the like is for the purpose of helping conviction of the offender,” which “has no
proper application to the long-standing policy of civil protection of buyers from
persons guilty of such trick or fraud” that lies at the root of good faith
purchaser protection.70
When the good faith purchaser doctrine was codified in the U.C.C., the
codifiers seem to have been motivated by these basic considerations, but they
nonetheless chose not to define the concept of voidable title beyond specifying
a few situations where conflicting opinions had emerged in prior case law. The
comments accompanying section 2-403 therefore describe these situations as
“troublesome under prior law,” and the section itself identifies four scenarios
that appear to be exemplars of such voidable title.71
The first involves cases of impersonation—situations where the original
owner “was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser.”72 The identity here
relates to the factual dimension of the person and not their legal status. The
second involves the common situation of bad checks that bounce owing to
insufficient funds.73 Here, even though as a technical matter the original sale
(from the owner to the fraudulent buyer) now lacks good consideration, the title
is treated as voidable until actually avoided. The third situation involves “cash
sales” where goods are delivered upon an agreement that no title is to transfer
until actual payment is received.74 Despite such an agreement, the buyer (who

67. The original formulation of malum in se traces back to Blackstone, who identified theft as
belonging to that category. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at *54.
68. See U.C.C. § 2-403 cmt. 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. § 2-403(1)(b).
74. Id. § 2-403(1)(c); see also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 47, at 202.
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doesn’t pay) obtains voidable rather than void title in the same way as she
would in situations involving bad checks. The fourth situation covers instances
where delivery of the goods is obtained through fraudulent behavior that would
be punishable under criminal law as larcenous.75 Here, despite the possibility of
criminal punishment, the law treats the purchaser’s title as merely voidable,
allowing the good faith purchaser to obtain good title.
The concept of voidable title thus emerged as a means by which to
balance the true owner’s and the innocent purchaser’s interests, rather than as a
mechanism for penalizing criminal conduct. Today, the concept covers title that
is tainted by a wide variety of actions, with the sole exception of theft (which
produces void title).
C. Justifications for the Common Law Doctrine
As it works today, the good faith purchaser doctrine—with its reliance on
the idea of voidable title—splits the risk between the innocent purchaser and
the original owner. The purchaser with no knowledge of the taint merely needs
to ensure that the seller’s title has not been legally avoided prior to the sale, and
that the transaction is otherwise at arm’s length and in good faith. The original
owner, on the other hand, is thereby incentivized to (1) actively monitor all
dealings with the goods and (2) expeditiously commence an action to invalidate
the seller’s voidable title once a taint is detected so as to prevent the seller from
passing on good title to a good faith purchaser. Two related, but nonetheless
distinct, concerns therefore motivated the development and expansion of the
doctrine.
The first concern originates in the idea of consumer protection and its
recognition that in a market economy, buyers—unlike sellers—have little
specialized knowledge about the goods being purchased.76 This asymmetry in
bargaining power and access to information necessitates shifting the risk of
cloudy or ambiguous title away from an innocent, good faith buyer and onto
the seller, who presumptively has the resources and expertise needed to
eliminate such ambiguity in one way or another. Requiring a consumer to
research a vendor’s title to the chattel in question, especially in the absence of a
formal registration system for such ownership (for example, as there is for
motor vehicles), would be both unfair and inefficient. With the expansion of
the doctrine to new domains, the consumer protection rationale has begun to
develop obvious fault lines, especially in situations where the buyer is not an
individual consumer, but is instead a repeat participant such as a reseller or
vendor.77 Grant Gilmore best described this rationale in the context of good
faith purchasers when he observed that “[t]he policy of consumer protection
75. U.C.C. § 2-403(1)(d).
76. See Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1100–01; Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision
of U.C.C. Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1565, 1579 (1994).
77. Gilmore, supra note 1, at 1100–01
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defines or ought to define its own limits,”78 thus suggesting that the consumer
protection rationale is of limited applicability.
A second and more frequently advanced rationale lies in the idea of
marketability.79 Here, the concern is less with the protection of the individual
consumer (or with consumer welfare) and more with the systemic effects of
uncertain title on the functioning of the market and sales of the object therein.
In the absence of good faith purchaser protection, the pervasive uncertainty that
would necessarily follow is likely to deter potential buyers from entering into
market transactions out of fear that they would be saddled with the immediate
consequences of the seller’s tainted title.80 Even if market transactions were to
occur, it would likely have the effect of lowering the market’s valuation of the
goods, since the price would now reflect this pervasive risk. Rooted in the idea
of market efficiency, under this rationale the good faith purchaser doctrine is
directed at generating and safeguarding a buyer’s marketable title.81 What
matters in protecting a good faith purchaser’s ownership interest is the
purchaser’s ability to further transfer or alienate that interest to others in the
marketplace. The value of ownership, in other words, is presumed to reside
primarily in its ability to generate value for the purchaser.
It is important to appreciate that the concern with marketable title and
valuation is altogether independent of any enforcement action on the part of the
true owner. Regardless of whether the true owner finds it worthwhile to bring
an action (for conversion or replevin) to recover the chattel, the uncertainty
surrounding the good faith purchaser’s ability to pass on good title to others is
itself seen as an impediment to the efficient functioning of the market. This
point becomes critical as we move to the copyright context, since it reveals that
one of the concerns motivating the doctrine is agnostic to the enforcement
equilibrium, since that equilibrium is always influenced by a variety of external
variables such as the availability of insurance, transaction costs, etc. The ideal
of marketable title in the chattel is therefore analytically and functionally
unconnected to the good faith purchaser’s (or indeed the true owner’s)
behavior. The mere existence of the pervasive uncertainty relating to a
purchaser’s ability to pass on good title to others imposes an externality on
other market participants, which is likely to deter market behavior and render
the overall functioning of the market less efficient.82

78. Id. at 1101.
79. See JONES, supra note 3, at 3 (“The policy of the Courts has been, so far as accords with
justice, to promote the commerce of the nation, by making the circulation and negotiation of property
‘as quick, as easy, and as certain as possible.’” (citations omitted)).
80. See id. at 3–4; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 3, at 1358 n.81.
81. See generally William D. Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels:
Past, Present and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REV. 697 (1962).
82. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 24–41 (2000) (defending the numerus
clausus principle as similarly seeking to protect information cost externalities).
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II.
COPYRIGHT LAW’S PUZZLING OMISSION
Simply put, modern copyright law offers no substantive protection to
good faith purchasers of objects embodying infringing expression. While the
law doesn’t hold good faith purchasers liable for their purchase, it subjects their
subsequent resale or alienation of the object (carrying infringing expression) to
liability for infringement. Indeed, it does so despite being fully cognizant of the
need to differentiate between ownership of expression and ownership of the
chattel in which the expression is embodied.83 Copyright law thereby effects
what has been described as a “forcing,” an involuntary imposition of ownership
on someone.84 This Part attempts to unpack this anomaly.
A. The Current Position
Among the several rights that the 1976 Copyright Act grants copyright
owners is the exclusive right “to distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending.”85 In effect, the exclusive right to alienate copies of the protected work
thus resides with the copyright owner. The distribution right, as it is called, has
long been seen as an essential part of the copyright owner’s bundle of rights
and can be traced back to the earliest copyright statutes.
On its face, the distribution right appears to extend only to a “public”
distribution. However, the term “public” finds no definition in the statute, and
presumably derives from the Act’s merger of vending and publication into an
altogether new term.86 In the nearly four decades since the passage of the Act,
no court has fully considered the meaning of “public” and whether it might
limit the scope of the right. Nonetheless, the leading copyright treatise suggests
that it does have some significance and notes that “private sales . . . fall outside
the scope of infringement liability.”87 Since all sales are by definition private or
bilateral in nature, determining when a sale is private (as opposed to public) is
fraught with problems. The distinction seems to hinge on whether the
acquisition of the object was open to any member of the public—such as when
it is advertised, or listed for sale on a publicly accessible website or service—or
whether it was limited to an identifiable individual.88 If this is indeed the only

83. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under
a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.”).
84. See Lee Anne Fennell, Forcings, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1297 (2014).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
86. 2 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.11[B][1]; see also 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.10 (2014) (adopting a similar position). But see John M. Kernochan, The
Distribution Right in the United States of America: Review and Reflections, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1407,
1410 (1989) (arguing that the term does not limit the distribution right).
87. 2 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.11[C][1][b] n.139.
88. See id. (suggesting the existence of a “designated recipient” to operationalize the
distinction); 4 PATRY, supra note 86, § 13.10 (suggesting that the distinction is whether the
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distinction, it hinges entirely on to whom the defendant might have been
willing to sell the product, which is impossible to effectively ascertain ex post.
This likely explains why courts routinely assume that nearly any distribution
about which the plaintiff has actual proof is sufficiently public to qualify as an
actionable distribution.89
A far more important limitation on the distribution right—and one that is
today codified in the 1976 Act—is the first sale doctrine.90 Early in the
development of the distribution right under prior statutes, the question emerged
whether the exclusive right to distribute copies amounted to a restraint on the
ability of a chattel owner to freely transfer or use the physical object (i.e.,
chattel) in which the copy was embedded. If the two were coterminus,
copyright’s distribution right would operate as an equitable servitude on the
chattel, restricting its owner’s ability to alienate it.91 The issue reached the
Supreme Court in the 1908 case of Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.92 There, the
plaintiff owned the copyright in a book, imposed a minimum resale price on
dealers, and purported to treat violations of the price condition as an act of
copyright infringement through notice on the first page of every book.93 The
statute in question granted copyright owners the “sole right to vend” protected
copies,94 largely analogous to today’s “exclusive right to distribute.”
Interpreting the true scope of the right, the Court refused to construe it as
allowing the copyright owner “to restrict future sales.”95 As the Court put it:
What the complainant contends for embraces not only the right to sell
the copies, but to qualify the title of a future purchaser by the
reservation of the right to have the remedies of the statute against an
infringer because of the printed notice of its purpose so to do unless
the purchaser sells at a price fixed in the notice. To add to the right of
exclusive sale the authority to control all future retail sales, by a notice
that such sales must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not
included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view, extend its
operation, by construction, beyond its meaning, when interpreted with
a view to ascertaining the legislative intent in its enactment.96
distribution was to someone as a member of the “general public” or as an identifiable person such as a
“family member, friend, colleague, or the like”).
89. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 300 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“[A] violation of section 106(3) can also occur when illicit copies of a copyrighted work are only
distributed to one person.”); Luar Music Corp. v. Universal Music Grp., 861 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40
(D.P.R. 2012); Jalbert v. Grautski, 554 F. Supp. 2d 57, 68 (D. Mass. 2008); Psihoyos v. Liberation,
Inc., No. 96 CIV. 3609, 1997 WL 218468, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 1997).
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
91. See generally Chafee, supra note 12; Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes,
96 GEO. L.J. 885, 910–14 (2008).
92. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
93. Id. at 341–42.
94. Copyright Act of 1860, § 4952, 3 Stat. 3380, 3406 (1901).
95. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 350.
96. Id. at 351.
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Thus emerged what has since come to be known as the “first sale” doctrine.
The Copyright Act of 1909 codified the first sale doctrine, and made clear that
“the copyright is distinct from the property in the material object copyrighted”
and that the Act did not “forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully obtained.”97
The current statute maintains this position but qualifies it in several
important respects. Section 109(a) contains the first sale doctrine and allows an
“owner” to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of a copy “lawfully
made” under the terms of the statute.98 In other words, the availability of the
first sale doctrine is contingent on the transferred copy being noninfringing. If,
or when, that copy is itself unlawfully made, that is, infringing, the defense
simply does not apply. Indeed, recent decisions of the Court affirm without
doubt this basic proposition.99
To the extent that the first sale doctrine was meant to be copyright law’s
primary mechanism of ensuring that it does not “qualify the title” of the chattel
owner by “restrict[ing] future sales,” it is limited exclusively to owners of
lawfully made copies.100 The Copyright Office put it best when it noted that
“[t]he distribution right . . . enables the copyright owner to prevent alienation of
the copy—up to a point . . . when ownership of a lawfully made copy is
transferred to another person.”101 A good faith purchaser of an object
embodying an infringing copy is therefore altogether outside any protection
offered by the first sale doctrine.
Additionally, copyright infringement today is conceived of as a strict
liability tort, meaning that the infringer’s precise state of mind is irrelevant to
the question of wrongdoing.102 The Copyright Act treats the question of the
infringer’s knowledge, intent, or negligence as irrelevant to the imposition of
liability, though the infringer’s innocence is a factor that courts are allowed to
consider in determining the appropriate remedy or the quantum of damages.103
Consequently, the good faith purchaser obtains no protection under the scienter
requirements of copyright infringement.

97. Copyright Act of 1909, § 41, 320 Stat. 1075, 1084 (1909).
98. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
99. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); Quality King
Distribs., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
100. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 210 U.S. at 35–51.
101. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 86–87 (2001).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Liu, 731 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In a civil suit, liability
for copyright infringement is strict.”); Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir.
2012) (observing that the “innocent intent” of the defendant was no defense to infringement); Faulkner
v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 576 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Copyright infringement is a
strict liability wrong in the sense that a plaintiff need not prove wrongful intent or culpability.”); Educ.
Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (“There is no need to prove
anything about a defendant’s mental state to establish copyright infringement; it is a strict liability
tort.”); 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1].
103. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 405(b), 406(a), 504(c)(2).
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Owing to these limitations, the good faith purchaser of an object
embodying infringing expression must hold on to the object for the duration of
the copyright term, or risk being treated as an infringer subjected to some level
of liability in transferring it in any way to members of the public. The statute’s
expansive definition of distribution in effect renders the purchaser’s title
altogether inalienable.
B. A Misplaced Rationale for the Omission
While Bobbs-Merrill did not expressly mention the “lawfully made”
limitation on the first sale doctrine, it is crucial to appreciate that the lack of
protection for good faith purchasers emerged independently and in a manner
that is analytically distinct from the narrowing of the first sale doctrine.104 The
first sale doctrine merely failed to remedy a preexisting and independent
problem created by copyright law’s gradual erosion and eventual elimination of
the “innocent infringer” defense to copyright infringement.105
Copyright infringement is a strict liability tort in the sense that the
defendant’s state of mind—intent, negligence, or knowledge—is altogether
irrelevant to the determination of liability. This remains copyright’s position
regardless of the precise right involved or the nature of the defendant’s
infringing activity.106 In other words, liability is strict regardless of whether the
infringement is of the exclusive right to reproduce, perform, distribute, or any
other enumerated right relating to the protected work.
As a historical matter, however, this was not the case under earlier
copyright statutes. The Copyright Act of 1790 (much like the Statute of
Anne)107 drew a distinction in its treatment of infringement between liability
for reproducing or publishing the work, and liability for selling or vending an
infringing work.108 As to the latter, which corresponds to the modern
distribution right, the statute provided that liability would attach:
[I]f any other person or persons . . . shall print, reprint, publish, or
import . . . any copy or copies of such map, chart, book or books,
without the consent of the author or proprietor thereof . . . ; or knowing
the same to be so printed, reprinted, or imported, shall publish, sell, or
expose to sale, or cause to be published, sold or exposed to sale, any
copy of such map, chart, book or books, without such consent first had
and obtained in writing.109

104. Indeed, it seems to have flowed from U.S. copyright law’s gradual elimination of the
innocent infringer defense. For an excellent overview of this occurrence, see Reese, supra note 16, at
133.
105. Id.
106. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1] (“In actions for statutory copyright
infringement, the innocent intent of the defendant constitutes no defense to liability.”).
107. See Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Ann., c. 19, § II (1710) (Gr. Brit.).
108. See Copyright Act of 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790).
109. Id. (emphasis added).
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For liability to attach for selling or vending an article containing infringing
expression, the seller therefore had to know of the infringing nature of the
product in question.110 The provision succeeded in creating a bifurcated system
of liability, which remained in all copyright legislation until the enactment of
the 1909 Act—in effect establishing an “innocent seller” exception to copyright
infringement.
The innocent seller exception offered significantly wider protection than
the common law’s good faith purchaser doctrine. First, it treated the
requirement of knowledge as an element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case.
Although analytically it remained an exception to infringement, as a structural
matter it was not a defense but rather an affirmative requirement of the
plaintiff’s case to establish infringement. Perhaps for this reason, courts seem
to have adhered to the requirement in varying degrees, depending on context.111
Second, the primary impetus for the exception was to free large sellers from
having to bear the prohibitive costs of determining the infringing nature of
expression embodied in their products (primarily books).112 The rationale for
the exception was thus the protection of sellers—and their overall enterprise—
rather than the marketability of the individual goods themselves. Consumer
protection, so to speak, had very little to do with the innocent seller exception,
reflected in the emphasis on the seller rather than the purchaser. Third, by
conditioning liability on the seller’s knowledge of the underlying infringement,
the seller was able to avoid liability in a variety of different situations,
especially where the copying wasn’t a direct reproduction of the protected
work. In such situations, establishing that the seller had knowledge of the
infringing nature of the underlying content remained fraught with difficulty,
and often impossible to prove in individual cases.113 It is perhaps owing to a
mix of these reasons that courts came to apply the exception somewhat
erratically, on occasion completely ignoring the mandate of the statute.114
The Copyright Act of 1909 altogether eliminated the exception for
innocent infringers, rejecting any consideration of the defendant’s state of mind

110. See EATON S. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL
PRODUCTIONS 487 (1879) (observing that for a seller to be liable for copyright infringement, “it must
be shown” that the seller “was aware of th[e] fact” of the underlying infringement).
111. For an overview, see Reese, supra note 16, at 156–60.
112. See id. at 160 (noting how a “seller of copyrighted works would generally be poorly
positioned to determine whether the copies she sold were infringing”).
113. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 999 (2d Cir. 1983)
(“[T]he problems of proof inherent in a rule that would permit innocent intent as a defense to copyright
infringement could substantially undermine the protections Congress intended to afford to copyright
holders.”); 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1] (noting how an additional problem with the
exception is that “a defendant may easily plead innocence, and the plaintiff [may] be left without any
practical ability to disprove it”).
114. See Reese, supra note 16, at 156–60.
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in determining copyright infringement.115 This change in position was
conscious, since the “innocent infringer” was discussed during hearings leading
up to the passage of the Act.116 The sole form of protection for innocent
infringers was in the limitation of remedies.117
The Act of 1976 preserved this structure. Legislative history
accompanying the Act reveals that Congress closely considered—but
ultimately rejected—the possibility of reintroducing protection for innocent
infringers.118 Indeed, the history suggests that in the intervening period the
Supreme Court had come to accept the reality that “good faith of the
defendants” was altogether irrelevant to the question of infringement.119
Responding to a study by the Copyright Office on the question of reintroducing
innocent infringer protection, noted copyright scholar Melville Nimmer offered
the following reasons for why the law should avoid such protection:
It is my view that basic to the problem of innocent infringement must
be the underlying premise that as between two innocent parties (i.e.,
the copyright owner and the infringer), it is the infringer who must
suffer, since he, unlike the copyright owner, either has an opportunity
to guard against the infringement (by diligent inquiry), or at least the
ability to guard against the infringement [contractually or through
insurance]. . . . Moreover, it is generally true that the volume
purveyors of copyrighted materials . . . are, in fact, innocent of any
knowledge of infringement. Even where there is an absence of such
innocence, it is usually on the basis of negligence (of a type difficult to
establish), rather than knowledge. Therefore, to render a complete or
partial exemption for the innocent infringer would seriously impair the
protection afforded to a copyright owner.120
Nimmer’s observations highlight the prevailing understanding at the time,
which Congress came to endorse as part of the 1976 Act. Exempting innocent
sellers from liability for infringement was, as noted previously, premised on the
idea that they bear an undue burden as part of their product sales. This concern
alone, as Nimmer suggests, was hardly worthy of protection—especially at the
expense of the copyright owner’s interests. To the extent that sellers were
taking a risk when purveying potentially infringing goods, they could obtain an

115. Alan Latman & William S. Tager, Study No. 25: Liability of Innocent Infringers of
Copyrights, in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION: STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS 139, 141 (1958) (“[T]he 1909 statute contained no broad
provisions excusing innocent infringers.”); Reese, supra note 14, at 175.
116. Latman & Tager, supra note 115, at 141.
117. Id.
118. As an example, see id. at 135–69.
119. See id. at 145.
120. Melville B. Nimmer et al., Comments and Views Submitted to the Copyright Office on
Liability of Innocent Infringers of Copyright, in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 115, at 159,
169. These concerns find discussion in the Nimmer treatise as well. See 4 NIMMER, supra note 14,
§ 13.08[B][1].
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indemnity agreement from the manufacturer, protect their interests through
insurance, or both.121 As Nimmer points out, volume sellers are usually
blissfully (or willfully) ignorant of the infringement in question, even when not
altogether innocent or in full knowledge of the same. Calibrating when and
how liability might be imposed on such intermediate situations thus posed a
host of additional concerns, all of which could be at the expense of the
copyright owner’s rights. Not surprisingly, in 1976 Congress avoided
extending any protection to the innocent infringer or seller as a matter of
substantive liability and retained a series of minor protections at the remedial
stage, just as it had in 1909. This remains the law today.
With the elimination of the innocent seller exception and the curtailment
of the first sale doctrine, good faith purchasers were left with no substantive
protection under copyright law. It is important to appreciate that when
discussing innocent infringer protection under copyright law, the legislative
history focused on broad-based protection (i.e., relating to liability in general)
and not narrower protection relating to good faith purchasers as a separate
class of market participants. Indeed, this point is borne out in Nimmer’s
comments about the seller being able to obtain a contractual indemnity or
insurance protection against infringement—both of which assume a
commercial vendor rather than an individual attempting to sell their used
product, such as Joe in our earlier hypothetical. Consequently, the legislative
history contains no direct discussion of copyright law’s deviation from the
common law in relation to good faith purchasers.
All the same, courts have interpreted modern copyright law as
consciously choosing against good faith purchaser protection. The Second
Circuit considered this question in Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics,
Inc.122 There, the defendant argued that it was in lawful possession of goods
embodying the plaintiff copyright holder’s protected works, by virtue of a
contractual delivery, which the defendant was allowed to resell without
permission under the first sale doctrine.123 In rejecting the idea that “lawful
possession” might be sufficient to transfer title, the court noted that such an
interpretation would allow “any bailee of such objects [to] sell them without
infringing the copyright, whatever his liability for conversion might be.”124 The
court found this to be problematic because it would mean that “an innocent
purchaser of a copy from a conceded pirate would be free to resell it without
liability for infringement” and “cases to the contrary are legion.”125 This last
121. Nimmer et al., supra note 120, at 164, 169. This argument and its solution are discussed in
some detail later on, in the context of the need for good faith purchaser protection in copyright law.
Ralph Brown, another copyright scholar, has also echoed and emphasized the point. Id. at 164
(commentary by Ralph S. Brown).
122. 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963).
123. Id. at 849–50.
124. Id. at 851.
125. Id. (citations omitted).
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observation is without doubt a direct rejection of good faith purchaser
protection.
Later cases shed more light on the analytical basis for this rejection. In
American International Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman,126 the Fifth Circuit dealt
with a case of copyright infringement that the owners of copyrights in multiple
motion pictures brought against a film distributor. The defendants contended
that since they were in lawful possession of copies of the films—from the
copyright owner—they were exempt from liability for further distributing those
copies.127 Again, the court rejected this argument, observing that “an unwitting
purchaser who buys a copy in the secondary market can be held liable for
infringement if the copy was not the subject of a first sale by the copyright
holder.”128 To support its logic the court further treated as uncontested the
principle that “unless title to the copy passes through a first sale by the
copyright holder, subsequent sales do not confer good title.”129 The court was
thereby implying that in the absence of a first sale the purchaser’s legal title is
tainted and copyright law offers no immunity from infringement. More recent
cases have put the point even more starkly, observing in no uncertain terms that
“there is no such thing as a bona fide purchase for value in copyright law”130
and that copyright contains “[n]o good faith purchaser exception to the first
sale doctrine.”131
Yet, when one probes courts’ reasons for rejecting good faith purchaser
protection, things become somewhat murky. Their reasoning can be traced
back to a crucial non sequitur in understanding the relationship between
ownership of an object and the copyright in content embedded into the object.
After 1909, copyright law clearly abandoned the need to establish knowledge
or intent as an element of copyright infringement. In this sense, the seller’s
innocence was therefore no defense to infringement. The Second Circuit in
Platt & Munk, discussed above, was therefore correct in noting that an innocent
purchaser who resells the infringing copy would face liability for copyright
infringement, even when they would be immune from tort liability for
conversion.132 Implicit in this analysis is the idea that since the common law
recognized a valid title in the purchaser (under the good faith purchaser
doctrine), liability for conversion would never attach. Copyright law certainly
does not recognize such immunity from liability since it contains no protection
for innocent purchasers.

126. 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978).
127. Id. at 663–64.
128. Id. at 664.
129. Id.
130. ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1331 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
131. Novell, Inc. v. Unicom Sales, Inc., No. C–03–2785, 2004 WL 1839117, at *12 (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 17, 2004).
132. Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 851 (2d Cir. 1963).
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All the same, the absence of such immunity from liability does not arise
because of any infirmity in the purchaser’s underlying legal title (owing to the
absence of a first sale) as the Fifth Circuit implies. Indeed it is the absence of
such immunity—and the resultant inability to alienate the object further
without risk—that produces the practical imperfection in the purchaser’s title,
and not the other way around. The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning inverts this logic
by mistakenly treating the consequence involved (i.e., functionally imperfect
title) as its very cause (i.e., legally imperfect title). The mere possibility of
liability for copyright infringement says nothing about the purchaser’s title to
the chattel itself. A transferor might become subject to liability to one party
while simultaneously transferring title to another. The mere possibility of such
liability does not legally affect the transferor’s ability to transfer good title,
even though we might note that as a practical matter the persistence of potential
liability impairs the transferor’s title. Thus, when the Fifth Circuit
unequivocally noted that it was only when there was a legal first sale that there
could be a transfer of good title, and that infringing sales were incapable of
transferring good title to the object, that proposition had no independent
basis.133 Neither copyright law nor the common law require or suggest such a
conclusion.
The risk of liability for copyright infringement may well exist at the time
that a chattel containing protected expression is transferred from one person to
another. Notwithstanding the existence of such risk, title nevertheless certainly
passes from transferor to transferee. Especially given the well-known reality
that title is a “relative” concept,134 in that it operates between two individuals,
the mere existence of good title in the transferee need not immunize the
transferor from liability for copyright infringement. The importance of this
logic, which originates in copyright law’s structure as a private law mechanism
rather than as a system of public regulation, cannot be overstated.
Although copyright law grants copyright owners a cause of action for
interference with their exclusive right to distribute, it does not seek to enforce
that right independent of the copyright owners’ own actions. In other words, it
actively delegates the decision of whether and when to pursue an action to the
private party involved, resulting in horizontal actions between two private
parties.135 This is materially different from situations where the law actively
penalizes or criminalizes certain market transfers and subjects transferors to

133. Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc., 576 F.2d at 664.
134. For a recent account of this idea, see David Fox, Relativity of Title at Law and in Equity,
65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 330 (2006).
135. For a general discussion of how copyright law delegates enforcement to private actors, i.e.,
copyright owners, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S.
CAL. L. REV. 723, 752–60 (2013).
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punishment for attempting such transfers.136 Certain kinds of cultural artifacts,
animal products, hazardous materials, weapons, and the like fall into these
categories. When the law forbids transfers of such objects, it would be
appropriate to suggest that the very transfer being opposed to the law becomes
void, in effect tainting it altogether, resulting in there being no lawful transfer
of title.137 However, when the law doesn’t forbid the transfer but instead merely
subjects it to potential private law liability, it makes little sense to suggest that
the transfer itself doesn’t produce good title in the transferee.138
Treating an infringing, nonfirst sale as incapable of transferring title rests
on a belief that it is the copyright owner who has good title to such infringing
articles, since the only way to legalize them is through the copyright owner’s
authorization. Yet this conflates ownership of the infringing article with
ownership of the copyright, a proposition that copyright law vehemently tries
to distance itself from.139 Indeed even early common law came to reject this
conflation when copyright owners attempted to rely on the ownership-based
doctrine of chattel replevin to demand that infringing copies be delivered to
them upon a finding of infringement.140 Treating title to the chattel, even when
it incorporates infringing content, as independent from ownership of copyright
is thus a well-enshrined ideal—one that the Fifth Circuit’s logic turns on its
very head.
The Fifth Circuit’s observation could be read to suggest that the purchaser
did not obtain good title in the narrow sense of being able to further transfer the
work onto others without potential liability. However, this would make sense
only if the court was using the idea of “good title” entirely in explanatory
terms, as denoting the consequence of no immunity. As noted previously,
however, the court appears to use the phrase as a justification for the lack of
immunity; in other words, as a reason rather than as a consequence. This
136. See generally Robert Iraola, A Primer on the Criminal Penalty Provisions of the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 431 (2003); Susan RoseAckerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
137. Agreements in direct contravention of a statutory prohibition are thus routinely declared by
courts as void. See Trotter v. Nelson, 684 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (Ind. 1997), abrogated on other grounds
by Liggett v. Young, 877 N.E.2d 178 (Ind. 2007); 15 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 79.2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., 2014).
138. This is analogous to the situation where a seller contracts to sell an object to a buyer at a
future date, but in the intervening period sells it to a stranger. In making the sale to the stranger, the
seller is certainly risking the possibility of liability for breach of contract, and the buyer may or may
not choose to sue when performance becomes due. Yet, this potential liability says nothing about the
validity of the stranger’s title, which is unquestionably good. The seller’s liability to the buyer was
personal and bears no relationship to the stranger’s title.
139. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739 (describing the principle as “a fundamental and important one”).
140. See Colburn v. Simms (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 224 (Ch.) 229; 2 Hare 543, 554–55 (refusing
to find such a remedy to rest on any “common-law right anterior” to the terms of the statute). Later
U.S. courts also adopted this position and continued to reject the replevin argument. For a useful
discussion, see Marc Alexander, Discretionary Power to Impound and Destroy Infringing Articles: An
Historical Perspective, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 479, 484–85 (1982).
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renders such a reading suspect and confirms the court’s circular logic. Further,
to suggest that good title in the object is somehow related to potential copyright
liability produces the anomaly that a person with bad title at the time of the
transfer somehow obtains good title the moment the copyright term in the
underlying content expires. A third and equally troublesome reading of the
court’s observation is that its use of the term “title” was in relation to the
underlying copyright, not the physical object. Again, this seems improbable
since the court’s entire discussion was in relation to the first sale doctrine,
which relates only to the physical object and not the sale of the copyright.141 In
addition, the statute defines “copies” in terms of the “material object . . . in
which a work is fixed,” making this distinction clear.142
Consequently, a copyright law-compliant first sale is hardly a prerequisite
for good title in the copy. The problem with the Fifth Circuit’s logic in
American International Pictures is that it suggests, especially to other courts,
that copyright law’s omission of good faith purchaser protection relates
somehow to the intrinsically tainted nature of that purchaser’s title. Copyright
law, however, says nothing about that. Yet, almost every court in the country
that has since considered the question makes reference to the title-based logic
of the Fifth Circuit, giving it an aura of credibility that it simply does not seem
to deserve.143
Caught between the elimination of the innocent seller exception, the
narrowing of the first sale defense, and the faulty logic connecting title to
potential liability for copyright infringement, copyright law today contains no
version of protection for good faith purchasers of value. Substantively much of
the fear with such protection is its negative impact on copyright owners and
their market. Allowing purchasers to further alienate infringing copies of a
work without liability can crowd out the market for original, noninfringing
versions, which is in turn likely to interfere with copyright’s incentive to create.
What this concern ignores is the possibility of an intermediate position that
remains sensitive to the concerns of both purchasers and copyright owners.
C. Justifying Good Faith Purchaser Protection in Copyright Law
As noted previously, the two principal reasons for the development of the
good faith purchaser doctrine at common law were consumer protection and
marketability.144 Consumers were seen to be at a serious informational
disadvantage vis-à-vis nefarious vendors whose title was tainted in some way.
141. See Am. Int’l Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 1978).
142. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies”).
143. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2011); Metal
Morphosis, Inc. v. Acorn Media Publ’g, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2009); Microsoft
Corp. v. Big Boy Distribution LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Palmetto Builders &
Designers, Inc. v. UniReal, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474 (D.S.C. 2004); Too, Inc. v. Kohl’s Dep’t
Stores, Inc., No. 2:01-CV-1256, 2002 WL 31409852, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 4, 2002).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 76–82.
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In recognition of this, the law chose to split the risk of such nefarious behavior
equally between the true owner and the good faith purchaser.145 Similarly, the
common law was concerned that saddling consumers with the consequences of
nefarious intermediaries would impede consumers’ willingness to purchase
goods. Without protection, purchasers would run the risk of losing their
acquisitions if the chain of title was tainted in some way despite best efforts to
ensure good title.146 Not surprisingly, both reasons carry over to the modern
copyright context, albeit with some modification.
Copyright law has undoubtedly expanded over the last few decades. This
expansion has been in terms of altogether new subject matter as well as
expanded coverage for existing subject matter.147 Taken together with
copyright’s elimination of formalities as a prerequisite for protection,148 this
reality has unquestionably had the effect of dramatically increasing the
likelihood of protected expression being copied, often times without the
infringer’s knowledge of such copying or its unlawfulness.149 As the Supreme
Court recently confirmed, an overwhelming majority of consumer products
today contain copyrighted expression in some form or another; either in the
form of software code, or literary and artistic content contained in the product’s
packaging, design, or instructions.150 While this in itself poses a challenge for
consumers to determine the legality of a manufacturer’s use of such content,
the problem is compounded to a large degree by the nonmodular nature of such
content within consumer products.
In a vast majority of consumer products where copyrighted content is
used, even if a consumer is able to discern and identify the existence of
copyrighted content, such content ordinarily remains inseparable—to the
consumer—from the rest of the product involved.151 Returning to our example
involving Joe and Honda’s use of infringing software code: even if Joe were
informed that his car contained such infringing code, he is very likely (unless
he is a Honda engineer!) in no position to disaggregate the infringing software
from the car to convert the car into a noninfringing article when he decides to
sell it a few years later to someone else. To him, the fundamentally nonmodular

145.
146.
147.

See id.
See id.
See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); WILLIAM PATRY,
MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009); Neil Netanel, Why Has Copyright Expanded?
Analysis and Critique, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007).
148. For an excellent overview of how U.S. copyright law came to eliminate copyright
formalities, see Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487–88
(2004).
149. See Reese, supra note 16, at 135–44.
150. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1365 (2013).
151. Property scholars have occasionally used the term “lumpy” to describe this attribute of
resources and the entitlements in them. See Lee Anne Fennell, Lumpy Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
1955, 1957–61 (2012).
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nature of the product means that the existence of some infringing content in
any small—and inseparable—part of the product could well have the effect of
rendering all of it useless. Indeed, this is true in varying degrees for all products
embodying expression, including literary works such as books.152 If a consumer
purchases a novel at a bookstore and later learns that a tenth of the book is
directly copied, the consumer has no way of ripping out only the infringing
content (even assuming it were identifiable) without destroying the entirety of
the book at the time that they seek to sell it used. Here again, the integrated
nature of the physical embodiment compounds consumers’ fundamental
inability to even know whether expressive content contained in their products
is infringing.
Added to this is of course, the well-recognized reality that determining
whether content is infringing requires recourse to courts. In situations where
the putatively infringing content isn’t identical to the copyrighted content, but
is at best “substantially similar,”153 determining whether actionable
infringement occurred is a highly complex question, even for lawyers wellversed in copyright law. It is therefore unrealistic to expect this of lay
consumers.154 In short, the belief that an innocent purchaser will be able to
determine, through any amount of “diligence,” whether (1) there is copyrighted
content in the product purchased; (2) such content is infringing in nature, as a
matter of copyright law; and (3) the content, even if infringing, is capable of
being excised from the rest of the product, is altogether unrealistic.
Even if such diligence is conceded to be insufficient, one might still argue
that purchasers who choose to eventually sell the product in question (without
knowing whether the expressive content embedded within it is infringing) have
the option of protecting their interests by seeking a contractual indemnity from
the manufacturer (i.e., original seller) of the product. Indeed, as seen earlier,
this argument was central to many commentators’ rejection of the innocent
seller exception to infringement under the 1976 Act.155 An indemnity
agreement as a mechanism of protection makes much sense when the seller is a
commercial entity that is regularly involved in selling goods.156 In these

152. Especially in relation to what is described as fragmented literal similarity. See Twin Peaks
Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns. Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1372 (2d Cir. 1993); TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond,
968 F. Supp. 2d 588, 597 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The original formulation comes from the Nimmer treatise.
3 NIMMER, supra note 14, §§ 13–28.
153. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Irina D. Manta & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging
Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 272–78 (2014).
154. Id.
155. See Nimmer, supra note 120, at 169.
156. For a useful discussion of where this practice was ubiquitous at the time of the drafting of
the 1976 Act, see Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Study No. 23: The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the
Copyright Law: An Exploratory Study, in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 115, at 59, 86
(1958) (observing how indemnities are “elaborately developed” in relation to a set of actors, all of
whom are commercial); see also Frank L. Fine, Record Piracy and Modern Problems of Innocent
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situations, obtaining an indemnity from a “supplier”157 works as an efficient
mechanism of mitigating the risk of liability from distributing a potentially
infringing product. All the same, an indemnity (or indeed insurance) makes
little sense for an individual, i.e., noncommercial, purchaser who might choose
to purchase a product for personal use, and then sell it as a used good several
years later. In these situations—ubiquitous in today’s marketplace—seeking an
indemnity from a seller at each transition point in the chain of title adds a layer
of transaction costs that could in the long run interfere with consumers’ very
willingness to resell everyday objects.
Indeed, the U.C.C. also recognizes this fundamental limitation. Section 2312(3) of the U.C.C. deals with the implied warranty against infringement, and
provides that unless disclaimed, a seller “warrants that the goods shall be
delivered free of the rightful claim of any third person by way of infringement
or the like.”158 Importantly, however, this applies only to a seller “regularly
dealing in goods of the kind” involved.159 In other words, the U.C.C.
consciously excludes individual, noncommercial resellers from its ambit, an
omission that is considered altogether unproblematic.160
Going back to our hypothetical involving Joe and his Honda Civic: if Joe
buys Frank’s Honda Civic and Cindy later seeks to buy it from Joe, the parties
are all individual consumers engaged in one-off transactions. In each sale,
neither party seeks to sell or buy used cars commercially. Consequently, it is
unrealistic to presume that buyers will be in a position to require their
individual seller to indemnify against all future copyright infringement arising
from sales of the car. Frank may, unless expressly disclaimed, obtain an
implied indemnity from the Honda dealer. However, this implied indemnity
will not extend to Joe since Frank himself is not a commercial dealer. Frank is
also unlikely to be willing to issue Joe such an indemnity, nor is Joe or any
subsequent buyer likely to bargain for one. A single break in the chain of
indemnities renders such protection meaningless.
The indemnity argument therefore cannot apply to the situation of
individual purchasers and sellers, and its application misapprehends altogether
the way chattels regularly change hands in society. Individual purchasers are
unlikely to see the need for an indemnity against liability for their resales, and
lack the negotiating power to demand such an indemnity from an original
seller, usually a commercial vendor. While the indemnity rationale may have

Copyright Infringement, 8 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 69, 87 (1983) (noting that, even in relation to some
commercial establishments such as record retailers, obtaining indemnities is problematic).
157. 4 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 13.08[B][1].
158. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2014).
159. Id. In addition, the drafters seem to have contemplated only patent and trademark
infringement, as evidenced in the official commentary, raising the question whether copyright
infringement was consciously omitted from the coverage of the provision. Id. § 2-312 off. cmt. 2.
160. Id. § 2-312 off. cmt. 3 (“A sale by a person other than a dealer, however, raises no
implication in its circumstances of such a warranty.”).
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been forceful as an argument against the innocent seller defense, especially in
relation to commercial vendors, its fundamental orientation is different from
that of the good faith purchaser, which focuses instead on the individual qua
purchaser rather than on the individual qua repeat seller.
A second concern is the effect of such pervasive uncertainty on the overall
marketability of objects. If consumers have no way of accurately determining
whether a product embodies infringing expression—knowing of the possibility
that if it does, their title becomes inalienable and the product could be seized or
destroyed161—their very willingness to purchase such products downstream in
the open marketplace could be impeded in the long run. To be sure, this has yet
to occur despite copyright law’s lack of good faith purchaser protection;
arguably, the theoretical possibility of such risk aversion remains hypothetical
at best.
However, there are at least two reasons to be less sanguine about this
reality in today’s context. First, the size and coverage of the market for used
goods has grown exponentially over the last several years.162 The advent of the
Internet and ecommerce has spurred this growth, putting a wider range of
individual sellers in contact with potential buyers (through services such as
eBay, Craigslist, and the like.163 As the volume and context for these
transactions grow, the pervasive uncertainty in their ownership and legality can
have negative consequences for the marketplace and for copyright law
generally. This is true even if these consequences are yet to be seen directly,
since copyright owners are yet to begin suing good faith purchasers who
attempt to transfer their infringing products on the used goods market.
Interestingly, in its most recent decision on the first sale doctrine, the Supreme
Court directly addressed the argument that the harm from such uncertainty was
greatly “exaggerated”164 since uncertainty had not been empirically shown to
have impacted consumer sales. Despite the questionable legality of the type of
sales involved, consumers had not exhibited the risk aversion that one might
legitimately worry about. The Court’s response was simple: copyright law,
consumers, and commerce should not have to rely on copyright owners’
forbearance. As the Court put it:
[T]he fact that harm has proved limited so far may simply reflect the
reluctance of copyright holders so far to assert [their] resale rights.

161. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012) (authorizing the court to “order the destruction or other
reasonable disposition of all copies . . . found to have been made or used in violation of the copyright
owner’s exclusive rights”).
162. See generally Brief of eBay, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kirtsaeng
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (No. 11-697),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11697_petitioner_amcu_google-et-al.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3UY-XMHL].
163. Id.
164. Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1390 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The absence of such suits
indicates that the ‘practical problems’ hypothesized by the Court are greatly exaggerated.”).
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They may decide differently if the law is clarified in their favor.
Regardless, a copyright law that can work in practice only if
unenforced is not a sound copyright law. It is a law that would create
uncertainty, would bring about selective enforcement, and, if widely
unenforced, would breed disrespect for copyright law itself. . . . [T]he
practical problems . . . are too serious, too extensive, and too likely to
come about for us to dismiss them as insignificant.165
In short, uncertainty over the legality of a transfer risks limiting the
pervasiveness and ubiquity of such transfers in the future, especially as the
market for used goods continues to grow and expand.
Additionally, there is good reason to believe that such collective
forbearance166 may be a thing of the past. While copyright owners may choose
not to sue individual resellers for violations of the distribution right today, their
willingness to continue this forbearance in the future is largely dependent on a
continuing alignment between their enforcement incentives and revenue
streams.167 As the transaction costs of enforcement decrease, through
assignments or otherwise, and copyright owners experiment with newer
revenue streams, it is possible to envision a future in which lawsuits against
individual resellers of infringing products become a viable enforcement
mechanism, and perhaps an independent source of revenue.168 With copyright’s
allowance for a minimum amount of statutory damages without any proof of
harm,169 copyright owners could come to see few disadvantages, if any, in
abandoning their tolerance for such individual instances of infringement and
instead attempt to deter such behavior through lawsuits or the threat of such
actions.170 Indeed, in a few industries, copyright owners have begun
experimenting with this approach, even though the practice is yet to become
widespread.171 Were this to occur, the prior enforcement equilibrium would be
disrupted, and the net effect on the marketplace for used goods containing
protected expression is certain to be a reduction in trade. Marketability, in other
words, would be impacted directly.
In short, the same set of concerns that motivated the common law to
develop the good faith purchaser doctrine applies with equal, if not greater,
165. Id. at 1366–67 (majority opinion).
166. Tim Wu has characterized such forbearance as “tolerated use.” See Tim Wu, Tolerated
Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 617 (2007) (defining the term to cover “technically infringing, but
nonetheless tolerated, use of copyrighted works”).
167. See Balganesh, supra note 135, at 747.
168. For an affirmative argument along these lines, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright
Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2277 (2013).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2012).
170. See Balganesh, supra note 135, at 764–69.
171. The recording industry remains the prime example, though it has begun in other areas as
well (e.g., copyright trolling). See id. at 738–46 (describing the activities of Righthaven, a copyright
troll that operated in the newspaper industry); Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s Customers
and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 725 (2005)
(discussing the spate of lawsuits against peer-to-peer filesharing in the recording industry).
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force to the principal settings where consumers interact with copyright law.
The challenge therefore lies in developing a mechanism that introduces such
protection into copyright law without impinging on copyright law’s core ideals.
III.
GOOD FAITH PURCHASER PROTECTION IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Having demonstrated how copyright law came to ignore any form of
protection for good faith purchasers, which it subsumed under its elimination of
the innocent infringer defense, this Part moves to the prescriptive. It argues for
the development of a good faith purchaser doctrine for copyright law, drawing
on the core rationale for the doctrine at common law and copyright law’s own
analytical and normative underpinnings. Part III.A begins by laying the
groundwork for the doctrine by describing how copyright law’s current
framework contains three important analytical ideas that may be fruitfully
synthesized into full-blown good faith purchaser protection in copyright law.
Part III.B then pieces these analytical ideas together into an altogether new
good faith purchaser doctrine in copyright law, and works through the new
doctrine’s consequences and implications.
A. Analytic Precepts
While copyright law may deserve a good faith purchaser doctrine owing
to the risk that consumers routinely face in relation to infringing articles and
the reach of the distribution right, the solution does not inhere in simplistically
transplanting the common law doctrine over to copyright. Copyright law
concerns itself with a host of additional considerations that are alien to the
common law, including the need to provide copyright owners with sufficient
protection in the marketplace to ensure that its promise of exclusive rights
continues to operate as an incentive for further creativity.172 Successfully
developing good faith purchaser protection in copyright law will entail
integration of the doctrine’s core considerations from the common law with
copyright’s foundational ideals, both analytical and normative. All the same,
embedded within the workings of the copyright system—and all too often
ignored—is a series of important analytical ideas which, when taken together,
suggest that copyright’s principal concerns might indeed be rendered fully
compatible with good faith purchaser protection. This Section identifies three
such ideas and lays the groundwork for an independent good faith purchaser
doctrine in copyright law, which Part III.B develops.

172. See generally COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 13–14 (1965).
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1. The Subsidiarity of the Distribution Right
As a purely conceptual matter, copyright infringement relies extensively
on the requirement of copying. Indeed, as some put it, “absent copying, there
can be no infringement of copyright.”173 Copying is thus a prerequisite for any
infringement of copyright’s exclusive rights, with the exception of the public
performance and public display rights.174 While the distribution right has
always been a part of the copyright owner’s arsenal, it too depends on copying
as a functional prerequisite, owing to the simple reality that the right relates to
distributions (or vending) of copies of the protected work. Consequently, as a
historical matter, violations of the distribution right were usually accompanied
by violations of the reproduction right, even if different parties were
responsible for them.175 The 1976 Act continued this dependence, by centering
the distribution right around “copies” of the copyrighted work, understood in
turn to mean the material objects in which the work is fixed.176 Since the
creation of those copies without authorization from the copyright owner would
amount to a violation of the reproduction right, the distribution right is
therefore analytically dependent on the reproduction right. This explains why
in the first two decades following the passage of the 1976 Act, hardly any
plaintiffs “alleged violation of the distribution right apart from violation of the
reproduction right.”177
With copyright’s allowance for the complete divisibility of its bundle of
rights, however, the distribution and reproduction rights can come to vest in
different owners.178 In addition, the advent of digital technology has ensured
that today, a work may be distributed by individuals without their making a
copy of the work themselves. While these developments have downplayed the
adjudicative dependency of the distribution right on the act of copying, the
analytical dependence of the distribution right on reproduction continues. It is
only in the exceptionally rare situation that one encounters a violation of the
distribution right without an analytically prior—and identifiable—violation of
the reproduction right, be it by the same party violating the distribution right, or
someone else.179 As a consequence, the distribution right is subsidiary to the
reproduction right as an analytical and practical matter. An action for a
violation of the distribution right will usually also allow an action for a

173. 2 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.01[A].
174. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (5) (2012).
175. 2 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.11[C][1].
176. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “copies”); 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (describing the distribution right).
177. 2 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.11[C][1].
178. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (“Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including
any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred.”).
179. For example, when a party makes copies of a work under a license from the copyright
owner, but then distributes those copies without the owner’s authorization after the license has been
terminated. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comp., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993); 4 PATRY,
supra note 86, § 13:9.
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violation of the reproduction right, especially in relation to tangible
embodiments (as opposed to digital products).180
On occasion, courts have translated this subsidiarity into practical
significance. A few early decisions under the 1909 Act relied on a principle of
secondary liability to give effect to this subsidiarity.181 In situations where
violations of both the reproduction and distribution rights were claimed, but
against different defendants, this principle allowed courts to deviate from the
default approach of joint and several liability and instead hold the violator of
the reproduction right primarily liable for the entirety of the damages. The
violator of the distribution right then became secondarily liable only if the
award could not be satisfied through the primary liability.182 The motivating
logic here was that the distributor’s liability was causally connected to the
copier-manufacturer’s actions, especially when the distributor had no
knowledge of the infringing nature of the copy being distributed. Very few
cases have since extended this idea further.183 All the same, it highlights how
the idea of subsidiarity can be fruitfully incorporated into the structure of
liability for violations of the distribution right.
More than just a legal concept, the idea of subsidiarity also embodies an
economic logic that courts have usefully employed in expanding the domain of
indirect liability for copyright infringement. Copyright’s doctrine of
contributory infringement is premised on the idea that in numerous situations,
one party higher up in the chain of causation, such as a device manufacturer, is
in a significantly better position—both as a matter of cost and technological
ability—to control infringement than others lower down the chain. The
upstream party is in effect the “cheapest cost avoider” of the infringement.184 A
very similar logic is at play in the principle of subsidiarity, where the
manufacturer, who reproduces the protected expression in the infringing article
and then distributes it on the market, is in a significantly better position than
downstream purchasers or resellers to control the harm produced. The
180. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.11[C].
181. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, 28 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), decree
modified, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940). For an early identification of this idea, see Latman & Tager,
supra note 115, at 146–47.
182. Detective Comics, 28 F. Supp. at 401.
183. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1963)
(accepting the logic, but noting that it was rooted in the concern with double recovery). For a modified
version of the rule, see N. Music Corp. v. King Record Distrib. Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) (eliminating joint liability for a distributor and restricting the distributor’s liability to “damage
which is attributable to their individual infringements”).
184. This approach, made famous by Guido Calabresi in the context of tort law, posits that
liability ought to be imposed on the “cheapest cost avoider,” i.e., the party that is able to avoid the
harm at issue in the most cost efficient manner. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 24–34 (1970); Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test
for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972). For an extension to copyright’s indirect
liability setting, see Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright
Infringement: An Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395, 398 (2003).
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manufacturer’s initial violation of the reproduction right is thus causally prior
to, and facilitative of, the subsequent violations. The subsidiarity of the
distribution right to analytically prior reproductions is thus but another way of
operationalizing the cheapest cost avoider logic.
2. Courts and Declarations of Infringement
The role of courts within the overall skein of the copyright system is
largely underappreciated. While courts play a very important role in the actual
making of copyright law and policy,185 they also play an equally central role in
the internal workings of the system. While patent and trademark law involve a
formal grant of rights by an agency following a review of the applicant’s claim
to exclusivity, the copyright system is formality-free in nature—meaning that a
copyright owner obtains protection, i.e., exclusive rights, independent of any
formal review by an agency, the Copyright Office, or otherwise.186 Current law
requires a plaintiff to register the work with the Copyright Office any time
prior to the commencement of a lawsuit for infringement.187 While such
registration constitutes prima facie evidence of the copyright’s validity,188
courts almost never defer to the registration unless both parties stipulate to its
validity. It thus falls almost entirely to courts to delineate the scope and
coverage of the plaintiff’s rights for the first time during an individual case,
especially if the work contains both protectable and unprotectable elements.
Determining the scope and coverage of copyright in a work is an issue
indelibly entangled with the question of infringement. It is often only during a
court’s determination of whether the defendant copied protected material that
the logically prior question of whether particular material within the work was
in fact protected gets addressed at all.189 Given the intricate connection between
infringement and scope, the court’s signaling role within the copyright system
remains critical, albeit unappreciated. A judicial finding of infringement or
noninfringement serves as public notice—for the first time—of (1) the
existence of valid copyright protection over the work, (2) the scope and extent
of such protection, and (3) the defendant’s violation of such protection. While
we tend to think of (3) as the principal function of an infringement action, the
reality remains that (1) and (2) are of equal, if not greater, significance to the
185. For a general overview, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Stewarding the Common Law of
Copyright, 60 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 103 (2013).
186. See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV.
677, 706–07 (2012) (describing this as the “screenlessness” of the copyright system); Joseph P. Liu,
Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 137–38 (2004) (describing the limited and “nonsubstantive” role that the Copyright Office has in copyright law compared to other areas).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), (b) (2012).
188. Id. § 410(c) (“In any judicial proceedings the certificate of a registration made before or
within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity
of the copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate.”).
189. See Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 722–26 (2010).
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working of the system. This is especially so, given the fundamentally in rem
nature of the copyright entitlement, and the law’s imposition of a private lawdriven duty “not to copy” on all others without the copyright owner’s
authorization.190
To the extent that the copyright system seeks to guide individuals to plan
their activities in a way that doesn’t infringe protected works, notice becomes a
critical issue.191 Courts and copyright litigation therefore play a central role in
alleviating the informational deficit produced by the system’s abolition of
formalities, a reality that is often ignored. Infringement determinations—
whether for a plaintiff or defendant—serve the all-important role of providing
notice to actors, even if it comes significantly later than would be ideal, i.e., a
judicial finding of infringement dates back to the commencement of
infringement, and applies not just on a prospective basis but retroactively as
well. At the time of the actual infringement, a defendant may therefore have
little notice of such infringement. Since knowledge is not a prerequisite for
liability, the notice that the judicial determination provides emerges far too late
for that specific defendant. The law recognizes this reality by providing
declaratory judgments on noninfringement, which parties frequently opt for.192
Notice of actual infringement—from a judicial determination—is thus of
no obvious utility in proceedings relating to that very act of infringement. It
remains of extreme utility, however, in situations where the legality of the
principal or original act of infringement isn’t the main issue addressed, but
instead the collateral (and downstream) consequences of such infringement are.
Good faith purchaser protection represents one such collateral consequence,
insofar as it is concerned with title over infringing articles and purchasers’
powers in relation to such articles that are acquired without actual notice of
infringement. Copyright law might thus fruitfully internalize the central role of
courts in generating actual and constructive knowledge of infringement in this
domain.
3. Reassigning Title to Infringing Articles
While copyright law does not contain a good faith purchaser doctrine, it
does provide remedies that empower courts to directly affect parties’ relative
claims over “infringing articles.”193 As part of a final judgment or decree,
section 503(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act authorizes courts to “order the
190. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling
the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664, 1665 (2012).
191. For a recent account, see Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice
Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 4 (2013) (noting the difficulties posed by the current copyright
system’s failure to provide actors with adequate notice).
192. See 3 NIMMER, supra note 14, at § 12.01[A][3][b]; Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, Reevaluating Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Disputes, 83 IND. L.J. 957,
967–69 (2008).
193. 17 U.S.C. § 503 (2012).
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destruction or other reasonable disposition” of copies made in violation of the
copyright owner’s exclusive rights.194 The remedy of destruction or forfeiture
has been in existence since the late-nineteenth century.195 It derives from the
recognition that infringing copies or articles could have the effect of interfering
with the market for the copyright owner’s original versions, thereby impeding
the limited market exclusivity that was a legitimate part of the copyright
bargain. Eliminating such infringing copies from the market, when feasible, has
thus come to be seen as an option for plaintiffs once an infringement is found,
and which courts may award on a discretionary basis.
While destruction is certainly the remedy most frequently sought under
section 503(b), the legislative history accompanying the 1976 Act makes it
abundantly clear that Congress included the phrase “other reasonable
disposition” in the statute with the idea that courts could use their discretion to
craft other remedial measures relating to copies as they saw appropriate in any
given case.196 The House Report notes that a court might “order the infringing
articles sold, delivered to the plaintiff, or disposed of in some other way that
would avoid needless waste and best serve the ends of justice.”197 The
equitable and discretionary nature of the remedy thus gives courts significant
flexibility to determine how title over infringing copies may be dealt with in
light of the equities of the case involved.
Courts have exercised this discretion in a variety of ways. One court, for
example, ordered the parties to negotiate with each other in an effort to see if
the plaintiff would purchase the infringing copies from the defendant.198 In
another case, a court granted the plaintiff the right to have all the infringing
copies destroyed, but then offered the plaintiff additional compensation for a
waiver of that right.199 And in a few other cases, courts have ordered the
defendant to deliver the infringing copies into the possession of the plaintiff,
thereby effecting an involuntary transfer of title between the parties.200
In the exercise of their remedial discretion in this area, courts are well
aware of the reality that they are reassigning title over the infringing articles in

194. Id. § 503(b).
195. For a useful discussion of this history, see Alexander, supra note 140, at 482–85.
196. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 160 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5776
(“Section 503(b) of the bill would make this provision more flexible by giving the court discretion to
order ‘destruction or other reasonable disposition[’] of the articles found to be infringing.”).
197. Id.
198. Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1188 (W.D.N.Y.
1982) (“[T]he parties should be afforded some opportunity to meet and determine whether some type
of purchasing or other agreement can be reached concerning the collection of existing works before
the court orders the erasure of any infringing copies.”).
199. Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffler, No. 1067, 1937 WL 25996, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1937)
(“The court is of the opinion that these sums should he [sic] reduced to $500.00 for damages and
$500.00 for waiver of the right to destroy the infringing memorial. . . .”).
200. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992) (discussing the “turn-over
order”).
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question, despite copyright law’s attempt to separate ownership of the article
embodying the work from ownership over the work itself. It is perhaps for this
reason that a few courts have declared that the remedy of destruction or
forfeiture is unavailable against innocent third parties who acquire the
infringing article without engaging in any overt act of infringement
themselves.201 In Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht,202 a case under the
analogous provisions of the 1909 Act, the Second Circuit denied the plaintiff
such a remedy against a defendant company that had merely acquired the
infringing copies at issue from another company that had unlawfully made
them. Judge Learned Hand thus observed in the case:
The plaintiff appears to suppose that Eureka Productions, Inc., which
produced the films and from which the Wyngate Company obtained
them, had no title to the “sound tracks,” and that the Wyngate
Company could therefore get no right in them. That is not true. It is
indeed true that while they were in the hands of Eureka Productions,
Inc. they were subject to be impounded, and if the plaintiff recovered
judgment against the infringer, they were subject to forfeiture and
destruction. . . . The remedy of forfeiture and destruction is given only
against an infringer, and the Wyngate Company was not an infringer
so far as concerned the making of the “sound tracks.” True, it was a
second act of infringement by Eureka Productions, Inc. to sell—
“vend”—the “sound tracks,” if it did sell them to the Wyngate
Company; but, even so, it was not an infringement for the Wyngate
Company to buy them; one does not infringe a copyright by buying an
infringing copy of the “work,” though the buyer will infringe, if in his
turn he sells the copy he has bought . . . .203
Here, Judge Hand makes several important points. First, the holder of an
infringing copy—even if they are the unauthorized producer or maker of that
copy—is not automatically denied title to it merely because it is infringing in
nature. Second, title to the copy may only be denied (through a forfeiture or
destruction) upon a finding of infringement. Third, and as a result, an innocent
purchaser cannot be denied good title to the copy, since the purchaser is not an
infringer under copyright law. All the same, if that innocent purchaser should
choose to sell that copy to others, it could trigger the remedy of title
reallocation. While the 1976 Act does not codify this limitation,204 the same
logic has been understood to apply to the terms of the 1976 Act as well.205

201. 5 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.08.
202. See, e.g., Foreign & Domestic Music Corp. v. Licht, 196 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952).
203. Id. at 629.
204. See Alexander, supra note 140, at 489 (noting how during the drafting of the 1976 Act
Congress “quietly dropped” any reference to this principle).
205. See Societe Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Int’l Found. for Anticancer Drug
Discovery, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1109 (D. Ariz. 2006); 5 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.08
(suggesting that this interpretation is “clear”). Indeed, the principle was seriously considered for
inclusion in the 1976 Act, with a few draft bills suggesting codification. See William S. Strauss, Study
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Copyright law thus provides for destruction of an infringing article, or a
reallocation of title to it, as remedies only when defendants have themselves
engaged in infringement. Where there is no act of infringement, the possessor
of the article retains good title over it. Nevertheless, this creates a paradox. If
the ability to alienate the article is taken as a central component of good title,
then it makes little sense to speak of title in such an article since the possessor
becomes an infringer—subject to title reallocation—the moment a transfer is
made. The only rational and practical way of solving this paradox involves
bifurcating the rights of a purchaser and seller in relation to infringing articles,
using the flexibility afforded by the statute (and equity) to courts in this area.
B. A Good Faith Purchaser Doctrine for Copyright
As we have seen, copyright law would stand to benefit significantly from
the introduction of some measure of protection for good faith purchasers.
While a mechanistic transplantation of the doctrine from the common law to
copyright law ought to be avoided, this does not imply that copyright law needs
to develop every last element of the doctrine independently. To the contrary,
there are elements of the common law doctrine that copyright law could
incorporate into its own formulation, eliminating the need for courts and parties
to grapple with the initial uncertainties that invariably accompany the creation
of a new rule.206
Since the objective of the doctrine is to protect “good faith” purchasers
“for value” of articles containing infringing copies, copyright law could retain
the common law’s understanding of when the good faith requirement is
satisfied, and what a purchase for value entails.207 Given that the same set of
consumers are the intended beneficiaries of protection under both doctrines,
retaining the common law’s understanding of good faith—on the assumption
that it builds on and informs prevalent marketplace norms—makes perfect
sense. A purchaser of an infringing article would thus be understood to have
acted in good faith when they had no actual, implied, or constructive
knowledge of the infringing nature of the article at the time of its purchase.
This is identical to how the common law standard relates to other kinds of
taints on the seller’s title. The same is true for the idea of a transaction of value,
where copyright law could outsource the question of consideration to state
contract law directly governing the actual transaction in question.
The most crucial modification that copyright law will require is the notion
of voidable title, the primary concept around which the good faith purchaser

No. 24: Remedies Other than Damages for Copyright Infringement, in COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
supra note 115, at 111, 122–23 (1959).
206. For a general overview of the problems associated with interdoctrinal borrowing, see
Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons: Corporate Law, Trust Law, and
Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651 (2002).
207. See generally supra Part I.
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doctrine came to revolve in the common law. Since the primary situations
where the void/voidable distinction emerged related to taints in the actual sale,
extending this concept and its legal consequences to the context of an
infringing article will require paying close attention to copyright law’s
treatment of infringement and its consequences in relation to the notion of title
in the article embodying an infringing copy. The discussion below addresses
this nuance while also examining the primary instances where a new good faith
purchaser doctrine for copyright law might work.
The doctrine would work in the main by ensuring that a good faith
purchaser for value of an infringing article (i.e., an object embodying an
infringing copy) obtains good title to it. This would in turn produce three
interrelated consequences: (1) until a judicial finding of infringement, the
person responsible for an infringing article (i.e., the manufacturer or copier
who is responsible for the reproduction) holds voidable rather than void title in
it; (2) a good faith purchase from someone with voidable title results in good
title, which may be alienated at any time without liability for infringement
(conversely, a purchase from someone with void title does not result in a
transfer of title and a subsequent sale can trigger liability); and (3) subsequent
purchasers from a good faith purchaser similarly obtain good title, and may
further transfer it onto others without inviting liability for copyright
infringement. Each of these is examined more fully below.
1. Void and Voidable Title in Relation to Infringement
As noted previously, good faith purchaser protection hinges on
recognizing the wrongdoer in question as having voidable, rather than void,
title in the object because it enables them to pass good title onto the good faith
purchaser. Leaving aside for the moment violations of copyright’s distribution
right and focusing instead on the act of producing or making an infringing
copy, the question becomes one of determining how the law ought to treat a
manufacturer’s ownership interest in the infringing article embodying the
unauthorized copy. Returning to our hypothetical involving Joe and Frank, the
issue is the nature of Honda USA’s title in a Honda Civic that it manufactures,
which incorporates unauthorized copies of Toyota’s software code, thereby
infringing Toyota’s reproduction right.
Early cases refused to treat the title in such infringing articles as vesting
with the copyright owner, even by analogy to the doctrine of accession. The
early English case Colburn v. Simms considered the question at length as a
matter of common law and concluded that “it does not necessarily follow . . .
that one who writes or prints upon his own paper the composition of another
has thereby so mixed his property with the property of the author whose work
he has copied that he has lost his original title to the material . . . .”208 Most

208.

Colburn v. Simms (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 224 (Ch.) 229; 2 Hare 543, 554–55.
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U.S. courts came to adopt this position, and held that, at least prior to a final
judgment of infringement, a copyright owner had no title to the infringing
article that would allow an action for replevin to be brought at common law.209
Once an infringement has been adjudicated however, the copyright
statute—both then and now—has allowed courts to grant the copyright owner
the remedy of forfeiture, thereby implying that a final judgment affects some
alteration in the title to infringing articles.210 While a final judgment does not of
course automatically vest title in the copyright owner, especially since the
remedy is discretionary, it may more appropriately be understood as having the
effect of invalidating the defendant-manufacturer’s title in the infringing
article.
It is in the above distinction that we find a mechanism for parsing the
infringer-manufacturer’s title in the infringing article. Until a final judgment of
infringement against the manufacturer, a manufacturer of an infringing article
must be seen as having voidable title in that article, and after such a judgment,
that title is rendered void. Not only is this position in keeping with the way in
which courts have historically treated title to the infringing article as part of the
remedy of forfeiture but it also comports with the law’s reasons for
distinguishing between voidable and void title, discussed previously.
The act of making an infringing article, while a direct infraction of the
reproduction right, is nowhere near the crime of theft in terms of its gravity and
social harm, and thus does not justify immediately tainting the infringer’s title
in the physical embodiment of the unauthorized copy. This is evidenced by the
fact that the law does not make the simple act of infringement a crime unless
willfully committed.211
Nor is the mere act of making an infringing article one from which an
illegality can be directly ascertained so as to vitiate the possessor’s title. As
discussed, the crime of theft was seen to do this, but only when the theft
(larceny) was overt, i.e., direct and nonconsensual.212 Such a taking was seen to
be direct enough, and since it required no additional evidence or inferences to
know whether it was unlawful ex ante, it was deemed to taint the entire
process. When the law expanded to cover thefts of a more technical nature,
where such an ex ante determination of illegality became impossible until
209. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 146 F. 375, 375 (2d Cir. 1906), aff’d, 207 U.S. 284
(1907); Hegeman v. Springer, 110 F. 374, 375 (2d Cir. 1901), aff’d, 189 U.S. 505 (1903); Gustin v.
Record Pub. Co., 127 F. 603, 605 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1904); Rinehart v. Smith, 121 F. 148, 148 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1903). But see Morrison v. Pettibone, 87 F. 330, 332 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1897) (taking the contrary view
and holding that an infringement gave the copyright owner title over the infringing article).
210. 17 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012).
211. Id. § 506(a)(1). Further, the mere act of reproduction or distribution, even when done for a
commercial end, does not produce an inference of such willfulness, which needs to be independently
proven. Id. § 506(a)(2) (“[E]vidence of reproduction or distribution of a copyrighted work, by itself,
shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement of a copyright.”).
212. See U.C.C. § 2-403 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962) (refusing to
extend the theft exception in good faith purchaser doctrine to the “extended law of larceny”).
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judicial determination, the mere categorization of the act as a theft or larceny
was taken to be insufficient to vitiate title on its face.213 The act of making an
infringing article belongs to the latter category. An infringing article consists of
a material object into which the protected work is embedded without the
copyright owner’s authorization. As long as the maker has valid rights in that
object, the unlawfulness in the making is impossible to determine ex ante.214
The illegality is therefore of a “technical” nature, which requires proof of
additional elements—one precisely of the kind that produces voidable rather
than void title.
Under copyright’s good faith purchaser doctrine, then, a person who
produces an article that contains potentially infringing expression obtains
voidable title in it. When a court finds the making of that article to be
infringing, i.e., as a violation of the reproduction right, that title becomes void.
The effect of the judicial finding is that the manufacturer’s subsequent transfers
of the infringing article invite potential civil and criminal liability, as well as
additional liability for contempt. Since the original defendant’s title may be
considered to be altogether avoided through such a judicial order, all
subsequent purchasers obtain no protection whatsoever.
To the extent that certain kinds of illegal copying are rather obvious on
their very face—for example, the manufacturing of counterfeits and their sale
at a significantly lower price—courts would still be empowered to deny
purchasers the benefit of protection by finding the element of “good faith” to
be altogether missing. This would be in keeping with how courts approach
similar issues in other contexts where a taint is apparent on the very face of the
transaction. In these situations, courts continue to treat the title in question as
voidable, and not void, but fault the purchaser for willfully disregarding the
circumstances of the purchase.215 The same approach might be fruitfully
employed in instances of egregious counterfeits, on a case-by-case basis.
The analysis thus far contemplates a situation where the infringing article
is still in the possession of its maker at the time of the judicial determination of
infringement. In many cases, however, the manufacturer will have sold the
article to a third party before the judgment, such that it is the third party and not
the manufacturer who is in possession at the time of the judicial determination.

213. Id.
214. As noted earlier, the act here resembles situations involving the doctrine of accession,
where a person mistakenly transforms the property of another such that the contributions of both
become inseparable. Here, the law determines the parties’ relative entitlements by reference to their
intentions and motives. As noted earlier, the common law chose not to adopt this approach with regard
to copyright. See Colburn v. Simms (1843) 67 Eng. Rep. 224 (Ch.) 229; 2 Hare 543, 554–55. For a
general overview of the doctrine of accession, see Earl C. Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal
Property, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 103 (1922).
215. See, e.g., Kotis v. Nowlin Jewelry, Inc., 844 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. App. 1992) (“An
unreasonably low price is evidence the buyer knows the goods are stolen.”).
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The next two Sections consider copyright’s good faith purchaser protection
under these circumstances.
2. Good Faith Purchasers of Infringing Articles
The discussion thus far has focused on the title of the maker or
manufacturer of the infringing article in that article, before and after a judicial
finding of infringement, based on a violation of the reproduction right. In most
situations, however, the manufacturer responsible for the production of the
infringing article (i.e., who has violated the reproduction right) isn’t in
possession of the infringing article at the time the judicial finding of
infringement is made. In addition, the person who is in actual possession of the
object is ordinarily a good faith purchaser from the manufacturer who produced
it. The question then is how the law should treat such purchasers, who obtain
the infringing article before any judicial determination, and who remain in
possession of the article when the determination is made—even though the
judicial proceeding itself doesn’t directly impact them (i.e., since they
themselves have performed no infringing activity).216
As noted, the person who makes the infringing article would, under
copyright’s good faith purchaser rule, have voidable title in it at the time that it
is transferred to the good faith purchaser, since no judicial determination of
infringement exists at the time.217 As a result, the good faith purchaser obtains
good title to the infringing article through the purchase. Indeed, recognizing
clear and unencumbered title in good faith purchasers who obtain an object
from a seller with voidable title to it remains the very raison d’être for the
doctrine. Consequently, the same treatment should be afforded to good faith
purchasers by copyright law.
Nevertheless, it is crucial to unpack what “good title” means for a good
faith purchaser under copyright law. Even under existing law, a good faith
purchaser can retain possession of the infringing article without any
interference.218 A judicial determination that the object is an infringing article
would not alter that since copyright’s remedies relating to forfeiture and
involuntary title transfer do not affect innocent purchasers who aren’t infringers
themselves.219 And the judicial determination itself only directly affects the
manufacturer of the article. The principal modification would lie in completely
immunizing a good faith purchaser from liability for infringement for further
transfers of the object to others. “Good title” to an object must encompass the
216. The reference to “judicial determination” here is exclusively to a judicial proceeding
brought against the manufacturer or maker of the infringing article in which the manufacturer or maker
as defendant is found to have infringed, at minimum, the copyright owner’s reproduction right. No
subsequent purchaser is a party to the lawsuit, since that purchaser was not involved in the act of
manufacturing the article.
217. See supra Part II.B.1.
218. See supra Part I.B.3.
219. 5 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.08.
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ability to alienate it on the market without liability, which renders such
immunity a logical consequence of recognizing valid title in the good faith
purchaser. As noted previously, under current law a good faith purchaser of an
infringing article risks liability for copyright infringement during such a
transfer by violating the copyright owner’s distribution right.220
Under the new doctrine, a good faith purchaser who buys an infringing
article from a seller with voidable title in it obtains good title. This entails
immunity from liability for further transfers of the article both before and after
the court finds the manufacturer liable for infringement and designates the
objects involved as infringing articles. The good faith purchaser can now
transfer valid title to other third parties without the law treating such transfers
as a violation of the public distribution right.
In essence, this doctrine works as a modified version of pre-1909
copyright law’s innocent seller exception to infringement.221 Yet it is
significantly different in two important respects. First, it applies only to a good
faith purchaser, and thus focuses on the behavior of the party at the time of the
purchase rather than at the time of the sale.222 It matters little that, between the
good faith purchaser’s acquisition of the object and its subsequent resale, the
purchaser learns of the infringing nature of the article—or that a court has
determined its status as such. More importantly, it would not extend to a
defendant who did not obtain the infringing article through an arm’s length
purchase. Thus, acquisitions through mere gifts would be excluded, as would
sales by retailers who obtain the articles as mere consignees from the
manufacturer, since they would not be transactions “for value,” and thus
beyond the market-driven rationale for the doctrine. Second, the protection
would operate as an affirmative defense that the defendant needs to assert,
rather than as part of the prima facie case.223 This would ensure that the
protection kicks in only when the good faith purchaser is sued for copyright
infringement, leaving unaffected the copyright owner’s burden in ordinary
infringement actions against sellers.
All the same, one might worry that by eliminating liability (for violations
of the distribution right) when good faith purchasers seek to resell the
infringing article, the copyright owner’s legitimate interests will be
significantly impacted. As we saw earlier, this was a concern that motivated
Congress to eliminate any protection for innocent sellers under the current
Act.224 A closer scrutiny of the immunity being offered under this new rule
reveals that copyright owners are unlikely to have their interests affected in any
220. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012).
221. See supra text accompanying notes 107–13.
222. Under the innocent seller exception, it remained unclear when the seller’s lack of
knowledge mattered. The plain language of the statute suggested that it was knowledge at the time of
the sale, rather than the purchase. See Copyright Act of 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790).
223. See generally text accompanying notes 207–216.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 113–19.
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significant way. When an infringing article is made and distributed, a copyright
owner’s interests are believed to lie in (1) obtaining compensation for any
economic harm suffered,225 (2) disgorging any profits wrongfully made from
the infringement,226 and (3) taking the infringing articles out of circulation.227
Each of these interests can obtain sufficient protection even without requiring a
good faith purchaser to be found liable.
Under the formulation suggested here, the copyright owner would still be
able to commence an action against the manufacturer of the infringing article
for both the copying of protected expression and for first introducing the
infringing copy onto market. The good faith purchaser obtains the article only
because the manufacturer chose to transfer it on the open market to the good
faith purchaser. The defendant-manufacturer is therefore likely to be in
violation of both the reproduction and distribution rights. Any possible
economic harm to the plaintiff is directly attributable to the defendantmanufacturer’s actions. All of the plaintiff’s lost revenues—the primary means
of computing economic harm for a damages recovery228—can be legitimately
recovered from the defendant-manufacturer. It is hard to conceive of any lost
revenue that the copyright owner suffers that might be attributable exclusively
to the good faith purchaser but not the manufacturer. While some copyright
owners may find a benefit to commencing separate actions against different
defendants, this alone does not suggest that reducing such actions poses a threat
to the copyright owner’s interests.
As for attributable profits, in most cases, resales by good faith purchasers
are unlikely to involve significant profits that are worthy of being disgorged
separately, rather than as part of the economic harm suffered by the copyright
owner—meaning that they could be factored into a court’s award of damages
for the violation of the reproduction right.229
This then leaves us with the copyright owner’s interest in ensuring that the
infringing articles are taken out of circulation, so as to avoid diluting or
curtailing the market for the originals. While this is certainly a legitimate
interest, it too is nonetheless constrained by the requirement that the remedy of
destruction or forfeiture cannot be applied to infringing articles that are in the
possession of innocent parties.230 As a result, the remedy is most suited to
actions directly against an infringing manufacturer who is still in possession of

225. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5777
(“Damages are awarded to compensate the copyright owner for losses from the infringement, and
profits are awarded to prevent the infringer from unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.”).
226. Id.
227. For a useful history of this remedy, see Ruth C. Trussell, A Reappraisal of the Impounding
and Destruction Provisions of the Copyright Law: Sections 101(c) and (d) and the Rules of Procedure,
26 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 95 (1976).
228. 5 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 14.02.
229. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5777.
230. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
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the infringing articles. Though current law makes an innocent reseller an
infringer, it is inconceivable how this remedy might be exercised against that
reseller since the “distribution,” which is a prerequisite for the infringement
itself, involves the defendant-infringer parting with title and possession of the
infringing article. While in theory the remedy may allow the copyright owner
to seek the forfeiture or involuntary transfer of any remaining infringing
articles in the possession of the reseller, it does nothing to take the alreadydistributed articles out of circulation. Consequently, immunizing good faith
purchasers from liability will have little effect on this particular interest of the
copyright owner. Again, insofar as they seek to take infringing articles out of
circulation, the copyright owner is better off going after the source, i.e., the
manufacturer.
The idea of subsidiarity discussed earlier provides a useful way in which
all of the copyright owner’s interests can continue to be served—by simply
emphasizing and enhancing recovery from the defendant-manufacturer instead
of the good faith purchaser. In some ways this formulation takes the idea of
“secondary liability”231—developed by one early court—a step further by now
making defendant-manufacturers of infringing copies primarily liable, instead
of good faith purchasers, for the economic consequences of such infringing
copies. Since the idea is not precluded by the terms of the statute or its
legislative history, the move is unlikely to be problematic.232
3. The Shelter Rule
The final category of purchasers who might obtain an interest in the
infringing article are purchasers who obtain the infringing article from a good
faith purchaser after a judicial determination of infringement has been made
against the manufacturer of the article.233 Since their purchase is after the
judicial finding of infringement, which is now a matter of public record, they
may be presumed to have actual notice of the article’s infringing character.
Consequently, it is questionable whether they would qualify for good faith
purchaser protection themselves since a lack of diligence about the infringing

231. Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, 28 F. Supp. 399, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), decree
modified, 111 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1940).
232. An objection to the requirement that the copyright owner bring an action against the
manufacturer rather than against the good faith purchaser is the three-year statute of limitations. See 17
U.S.C. § 507 (2012). Since the manufacturer’s infringing actions take place well before the good faith
purchaser’s resale, it might be seen as imposing an undue burden on the copyright owner. However,
this concern is easily remedied by incorporating a “discovery rule” approach to the statute of
limitations, or by commencing the tolling of the limitation period based on a “duty of diligence” that is
imposed on the plaintiff. See generally 3 NIMMER, supra note 14, § 12.05[B][2].
233. Note that here we are not concerned with purchasers who obtain the article directly from
the manufacturer, since after a finding of infringement the manufacturer’s title in the infringing articles
becomes void and the manufacturer is therefore incapable of transferring any title to a purchaser.
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nature of the article in question might render their good faith nonexistent at the
time of their purchase.234
The common law confronted this question during the evolution of the
good faith purchaser doctrine. Typically, after the sale to a good faith
purchaser, the original owner of the goods in question obtains a civil judgment
alleging fraud, misrepresentation, or the like, against the party with voidable
title. Subsequent purchasers from the good faith purchaser are then likely to
have knowledge or notice of the original defect at the time of their purchase,
rendering them ineligible for good faith purchaser status themselves. These
purchasers may not be perfectly innocent, yet to call their title into question
runs the risk of rendering the good faith purchaser’s title functionally useless.
Without protection for subsequent purchasers, good faith purchasers are
unlikely to further alienate their property. To ameliorate this, the common law
developed the “shelter rule,” under which a transferee from a good faith
purchaser obtains good title, regardless of whether the transferee qualifies for
good faith protection.235 In describing the shelter rule, one court observed:
As a general rule, if one is entitled to protection as a bona fide
purchaser, he may convey a good title to a subsequent purchaser
irrespective of notice on the part of the latter of defects in the title; in
other words, a purchaser with notice from a bona fide purchaser
without notice succeeds to the rights of the latter and occupies the
position of a bona fide purchaser. The reason for this is to prevent a
stagnation of property, and because the first purchaser, being entitled
to hold and enjoy, must be equally entitled to sell.236
Without the protection of the “shelter rule,” common law courts were
concerned that property would stagnate by remaining with the good faith
purchaser indefinitely, thereby also eviscerating the good faith purchaser’s title
of its functional significance by preventing further alienation of the property.
The shelter rule is crucial to good faith purchaser protection at common law
and essential to its very functioning.237 At its core, the shelter rule is more

234. Such diligence is commonly required under the common law’s traditional good faith
purchaser standard. See, e.g., City of Rio Rancho v. Amrep Sw. Inc., 260 P.3d 414, 423 (N.M. 2011)
(observing that “due diligence, [which] would have led to a knowledge of the infirmities” is an
essential element of good faith purchaser protection); Swanson v. Swanson, 796 N.W.2d 614, 617
(N.D. 2011); Ojeda de Toca v. Wise, 748 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1988). The idea of “diligent inquiry”
was also central to the concern with allowing innocent sellers an exception to copyright infringement.
See Nimmer, supra note 120, at 169.
235. See Amethyst Land Co. v. Terhune, 326 P.3d 12, 17 (N.M. 2014); 77 AM. JUR. 2D Vendor
and Purchaser § 419 (2014) (“The ‘Shelter Rule’ provides that one who is not a bona fide purchaser,
but who takes an interest in property from a bona fide purchaser, may be sheltered in the latter’s
protective status.”); JONES, supra note 3, at 120 (“When a bona fide purchaser acquires the title he can,
of course, transfer it to sub-purchasers, even if they have notice.”).
236. Schulte v. City of Detroit, 218 N.W. 690, 691 (Mich. 1928) (internal citations omitted).
237. See JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 407 (2012).
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about fully protecting the good faith purchaser than it is about protecting the
person seeking the shelter.238
Understood in this vein, copyright law ought to afford good faith
purchasers the same protection as the common law for its protection to be
meaningful. Under the new doctrine, purchasers who buy the infringing article
from good faith purchasers, even with actual or constructive knowledge of its
infringing status, should acquire good title in the article. Such title in turn
allows the purchaser to distribute it further without any liability for
infringement. Without a shelter rule, good faith purchasers in copyright law
would find their protection to be functionally meaningless, since few
subsequent purchasers, if any, would be willing to buy the infringing article
after a judicial finding of infringement. In effect, good faith purchaser
protection would be moot without the shelter rule.
Providing “sheltered” purchasers with immunity from infringements of
copyright’s distribution right might once again give rise to the concern that this
modification will come at a cost to the copyright owner’s interests. Again,
much like with good faith purchasers, any harm that such subsequent sales
produce for the copyright owner can be adequately quantified into the recovery
from the manufacturer of the infringing article. This modification, much like
the prior one, places an impetus on the copyright owner to expeditiously police
the source of the infringement, so as to hold liable the party that is also the
cheapest cost avoider of the harm at issue.
***
Building on the hypothetical involving Honda’s unauthorized use of
Toyota’s protected software code in the manufacture of its cars, consider the
following sequence of events illustrating the doctrine described above: Assume
that between January and July 2008, Honda manufactures several Honda Civics
containing Toyota’s code in their engine computer modules. On August 10,
2008, Toyota commences a copyright infringement action against Honda in a
federal district court, alleging violations of its exclusive rights of reproduction
and distribution. A few weeks later, on August 30, 2008, during the pendency
of the lawsuit, Joe purchases a 2008 Civic (containing the infringing content)
from Honda, in good faith. On November 15, 2008, the federal district court
makes a final determination of infringement against Honda, finding that it had
copied Toyota’s code into its cars during the relevant period. On December 1,
2008, Tony purchases a Civic from Honda, once again containing the
infringing content. Later, on December 20, 2008, Joe sells his car to Cindy,
who he finds on a used car website. At the time of purchase, Cindy knows of
the lawsuit and the court’s final determination.
238. See, e.g., Hancock v. Gumm, 107 S.E. 872, 876 (Ga. 1921) (“If one with notice sell to one
without notice, the latter is protected; or if one without notice sell to one with notice, the latter is
protected, as otherwise a bona fide purchaser might be deprived of selling his property for full value.”
(emphasis added) (quoting 2 GA. CIVIL CODE § 4535)).
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Even though the cars that Honda produces during the relevant period are
infringing articles, until the court’s formal declaration of infringement,
Honda’s title in them is merely voidable, rather than void. As a result, when
Joe purchases his car from Honda, he is a good faith purchaser for value. The
transaction is one for value, and Joe has no knowledge of the infringing activity
that taints the object, even though Toyota has commenced a lawsuit against
Honda at the time. With no final determination, the lawsuit does not provide
notice of infringement. Joe thus obtains good title to the car.
This is in contrast to Tony, who purchases the car after the court’s final
determination of infringement. The court’s finding that Honda infringed
Toyota’s copyright in its car manufacturing serves to convert Honda’s previous
voidable title into an altogether void title. Honda thus has no title that transfers
to Tony under the traditional nemo dat principle. While Tony gets possession
of the car, he has no legally recognized interest in it; as a result, he cannot
transfer it to a third party or indeed avoid liability for infringement should he
sell it to someone else. A consequence of Joe obtaining good title to the car as a
good faith purchaser is that Joe can further alienate the car without incurring
potential liability under copyright’s distribution right. Consequently, his
subsequent transfer of the car to Cindy does not invite liability for
infringement. Cindy in turn is protected under the shelter rule; even though she
has actual notice of the infringing nature of the article and would therefore not
qualify as a good faith purchaser herself, she gets the same protection and
obtains good title to the car since her acquisition was from Joe, a good faith
purchaser. The table below summarizes the sequence of events and their legal
consequences.

TABLE: EVENTS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES UNDER THE NEW RULE
Date

Event

Legal Consequence

January–July
2008
August 10,
2008

Honda manufactures 2008 Civics
infringing Toyota’s copyright
Toyota commences copyright
infringement lawsuit against
Honda
Honda sells a 2008 Civic to Joe in
a market transaction

Honda has voidable title in
the 2008 Civics
No legal consequence

August 30,
2008
November 15,
2008

Federal court finds Honda to have
infringed Toyota’s copyright in its
2008 Civics

Joe obtains good title to
the 2008 Civic he
purchases
Honda’s title to all its
2008 Civics is invalidated,
i.e., rendered void
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December 1,
2008

Honda sells a 2008 Civic to Tony
in a market transaction

December 20,
2008

Joe sells his 2008 Civic to Cindy
in a market transaction
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Tony obtains no title to the
2008 Civic under nemo
dat
Cindy obtains good title
under the shelter rule; Joe
is immune from liability

CONCLUSION
The persistence and gradual expansion of good faith purchaser protection
remains one of the enduring accomplishments of the common law. Reflecting
the common law’s commitment to free alienability and notice, as well as its
recognition of marketplace realities, the doctrine seeks a delicate balance
between the interests of the true owner and an innocent third party in a variety
of domains: chattels, negotiable instruments, commercial paper, and real estate.
Despite this reality, U.S. copyright law over the last century has offered very
little protection for good faith purchasers of infringing articles. Good faith
purchasers of infringing articles are instead taken to have questionable title to
such articles, and subject to liability for reselling them on the market.239
The legislative history accompanying the copyright statute reveals that
Congress never seriously considered creating a good faith purchaser doctrine. It
did consider—and reject—an expansive innocent seller exception on the
understanding that such protection was superfluous and might interfere with the
legitimate interests of copyright owners. Later courts mistakenly understood
this rejection to imply that an innocent purchaser of an infringing article
obtained no title in it. As a result, the idea that copyright law “rejects” good
faith purchaser protection became commonplace, and was taken to fit with
copyright’s analytical and normative commitments.240
Yet, as I have argued here, good faith purchaser protection is essential for
consumers of copyrighted works and, at the same time, perfectly compatible
with copyright’s goals and objectives. Consumers of copyrighted works operate
under the same informational restrictions and disadvantages as they do in other
markets where good faith purchaser protection has been extended. The
complex, standards-based system of copyright law only exacerbates this reality,
by making it near impossible for consumers to ascertain in advance whether the
objects that they are transacting in make unauthorized use of protected
expression. Protecting consumers against the wrongful actions of infringing
manufacturers by exempting their resales from liability is therefore essential.
All the same, this need not come at the cost of copyright owners’ interests.
Since it is the manufacturer of the infringing article that is primarily
239.
240.

See supra text accompanying notes 122–31.
See supra text accompanying notes 118–22.

322

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:269

responsible for the economic harm, copyright recovery can be simultaneously
recalibrated in that direction with few problems. In the process, copyright
owners and good faith purchasers will find their interests adequately protected.
With the rejection of a natural rights-based “common law copyright” on
both sides of the Atlantic,241 substantive common law is thought to provide few
lessons, if any, that copyright law could incorporate into its utilitarian
framework. It is perhaps for this reason that the absence of good faith purchaser
protection in copyright law has come to be accepted as an immutable reality by
courts, escaping scholarly attention altogether. To the extent, however, that the
common law is understood as “nothing else but reason,”242 crystallized over
ages, while remaining relevant in modern commercial settings, copyright law
would do well here to examine whether its divergence from it is unjustifiably
dogmatic.

241. See Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (HL) 846; Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 591, 682 (1834).
242. 1 COKE, supra note 29, at 138.

